In deference to reference by Segal, Gabriel Mark Aurel
IN DEFERENCE TO REFERENCE
by
Gab~iel Ma,rk Aurel Segal
B.A., London lJnlversity, 1981
B.Phil., ()xfor'd University, 1984
SUBMI1.,rrED '"f() rrfi~ DEPARrr~~ENrr OF' J.~lNGlJlS'['lCS
AND PHIL~OSOPf-IY IN PAR TIAL~ FULFlLLMENT ()P rI't·l!~





~ Gab~iel Mark Au rel Sega.l 1987
rfhe author hereoy grants to M.I.rr. permission to t1 eproduce and to



















This dissertation consists in three separate papers.
The topic of Iln Deference to Refernnts' is the semantic structure of
belief reports of the form 'A believes that pl. I argue that no existing
theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations
among expressions inside and outside of the embedded complement
sentences. I propose a new account of belief reports, which assigns to
embedded expressions their normal semantic values, but which also
exploits Frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of
extensionality in the reports.
In 'Who's Afraid of Narrow Minds?' I defend the thesis that the
propositional attitudes ascribed by folk psychology possess a level of
content ('narrow content') that is independent of anything outside the
subject. I examine various objections to that conclusion, and show that
they fail.
In ISeeing What is not Therel I examine the nature of the
representational contents attributed to perceptual states by the
computational theory of vision. I discuss Tyler Burge's claim that such
contents are not narrow, but depend essentially on aspects of the
external environment. I show that the claim is false, and that the
explanatory power of the theory of vision depends upon its employment
of a notion of narrow content.
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IN DEFERENCE TO REFERENTS
The wheel's still in spin
And there's no tellin' who that it's namin'
- Bob Dylan
In Deference to Referents
1 Introduction
The chief purpose of a semantic theory for a language, or a set of
sentences, is to explain how the semantic features of whole sentences
derive from those of their parts. Such explanations require a set of
rules that allow for the calculation of the ;emantic value of a complex
expression on the basis of its semantic structure, or logical form, and
the values of its semantically simple parts. The topic of this paper is
the semantics of propositional attitude attributions, particularly 'believes
that' sentences, like (1) and (2) below. I want to know the logical form
of these sentences, and the conditions that deLermine the semantic
values of their constant parts, 'believes' and perhaps 'that'.
Two enterprises might lead a philosopher to seek for a semantics for
'believes that' sentences or indeed for any other sort of sentence. One
such enterprise, associated with Frege, and these days with Quine, is
the development of a new language more suitable for scientific purposes
than the natural language which is the initial object of study. For one
with such a concern the choice of a semantics for 'believes that'
sentences will be guided by the suitability of the resulting canonical
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idiom - that is, the idiom that perspicuously displays logical form - for
use in a psychological theory. The enterprise that I shall be concerned
with in this paper, however, is the other one.
The second enterprise is the one Davidson distinguishes with the
words: 'the task of a theory of meaning as I conceive it, is not to
change, improve or reform a language, but to describe and understand
1it'. In seeking for an account of the semantics of attitude attributions
I seek to understand the workings of the actual English sentences.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine a number of alternative
accounts of the semantics of English 'believes that' sentences. My aim is
partly to promote the attitude expressed in the title of this paper, a
deference to referents, and tentatively to offer a proposal in keeping
with that attitude. But my aim is also to enhance our grasp of what a
good explanation in the theory of meaning is, by looking at the kinds
of evidence and arguments that may be relevant to it.
1.1 Methodological Remarks
Before launching into an examination of concrete cases, I want briefly
to discuss in the abstract the question of what kinds of evidence will
be relevant to the evaluation of specific theories of the logical form of
natural language sentences.
What is essential to a semantic theory, in the first place, is that it
I. Davidson, D., 'Truth and Meaning', Synthese xvii, 1967.
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succeed in correctly predicting the observable semantic features of
whole sentences. The form that such predictions take will depend upon
what kind of theory one is working with. So for example, a theorist
working within a Davidsonian theory of meaning - and I take myself to
be such a theorist - will try to prove the familiar T-sentences: 'S is
true iff p', where S is a structure-revealing description of an object
language sentence, and p is a statement, in the theorist's metalanguage,
of exactly the conditions under which that object-language sentence is
true. What is crucial here is to get the T-sentences right. When we are
in the fortunate position of constructing a theory of meaning for our
own home language, the evidence is not hard to collect, for it is not
hard to tell when a T-sentence is correct. The trick is to construct a
theory that proves it.
What further evidential constraints one wants the theory to be
answerable to, will depend upon exactly what is to count as a good
description and explanation of the linguistic phenomena under scrutiny.
A methodological conservative might seek only to articulate a body of
knowledge possession of which would suffice to interpret utterances
made by speakers of the language. For the methodological conservative
two semantic theories that prove exactly the same T-sentences, but
employ different axioms and mechanisms, are likely to be as good as
each other. They both get the right results. Each achieves what needs
to be achieved, but they do so in different ways. There is then no
need to seek for further evidence that would count for one theory and
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against the other.
From the point of view of the methodological liberal, on the other
hand, there is in principle no end to the kind of evidence that might
be relevant to the evaluation of a semantic theory. There are also all
sorts of general constraints on good explanation, that can be applied in
semantics just as they can in any other domain.
I belinkve that there is much to be seen from the liberal perspective,
that might otherwise remain hidden. Since I see no way of saying, in
advance of a search, what might count for or against a given semantic
theory, I see no reason to think that such a search would be a waste
of time. On the contrary, I think that a detailed examination of what
may count for or against particular proposals can only bring
illumination, both of the natural language itself, and of the exigencies
of understanding how that language works. 3
The liberal position will stand or fall by the quality and amount of
the results yielded by research that follows its guidance. This paper as
a whole may therefore be taken as a partial defence of liberalism.
2. The archetypical methodological conservative is Davidson. See in
particular his 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', Synthese 27, 1974. See
also Quine, W. V. O., 'Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic
Theory', in Harman, G., and Davidson, D., eds. The Semantics of
Natural Language, Humanties Press, New York, 1972, for a different
version.
3. For a defence of a liberal position, see Chomsky, N., Reflections on
Language, Pantheon, New York, 1975, and my 'The Topiary Theory of
Language', in Fukui, N., Rapoport, T., and Sagey, E., eds., M. I. 'T.
Working Papers in Linguistics Vol. 8.
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2 Frege's Problem
We turn now to semantics.
(1) Ralph believes that Tanya is a terrorist
(2) Ralph believes that Patty is a terrorist
Patty and Tanya are the same person. Let us suppose that Ralph is
ignorant of this, and that he has heard, from what he considers to be
a reliable source, that Tanya is a terrorist. On the other hand, he
firmly believes that Patty is no terrorist. In some circumstances it
would be wrong for me to report Ralph's belief as the belief that Patty
is a terrorist. Let us suppose that the wrongness of the report amounts
to its falsity, rather than, say, its being merely misleading, or lacking
in explanatory value.
It should be noted that such a supposition is not mandatory. One
could hold that, contrary to first appearances, intersubstitutions of
4
codenotational expressions in the content sentences of propositional
attitude reports do preserve truth value. Appearances to the contrary
would then be explained by pragmatic, rather than semantic,
considerations. It would be worth exploring the consequences of such a
4. I shall use 'denotes' and 'has as semantic value' interchangeably, to
describe the relationship that holds, in extensional contexts, on any
roughly Fregean theory, between an expression and its semantic value.
My use of 'denotes' is not standard, but is easily understood.
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view. But that is not my present purpose. I take it that the view is
prima facie less plausible than the alternatives and it is those .hat I
wish to explore in this paper.
So (1) and (2, may have different truth values, in spite of the fact
that they are composed of expressions with the same denotations in the
same order. Frege's response to this was to claim that expressions
embedded inside content sentences (that is the 'that' clauses of
propositional attitude reports) do not there denote their normal
denotations, but rather denote their senses. That is, Frege claimed two
things; one; expressions inside content sentences do not denote their.
normal denotations, and two; expressions inside content sentences do
denote their normal senses.
2.1 Constraints on the Solution
Let us follow Frege in supposing that embedded expressions like
'Tanya' and 'Patty' have some feature, "sense", that differs from their
normal denotation, and that explains how (1) and (2) can have different
truth values. The first question I want to ask is this: How do
embedded expressions contribute their senses to attitude attributions?
In particular I want to know if it is necessary that senses play the role
of denotations of the embedded expresssions. Or is it possible that the
5. For some such exploration see Salmon, N., Frege's Puzzle, M. I. T.
Press, Cambridge, 1986.
6. 1 owe the idea of this paragraph to Crispin Wright.
- 14 -
embedded expressions contribute their senses in some other way?
It might look as though the answer is mandated by the roles that
sense and denotation are designed to play.
What role does an expression's denotation play in the semantics? From
the point of view of a semantic theory, it just is what the expression
contributes to the determination of the truth value of sentences in
7
which it appears, and So the truth value of a sentence is a function
just of the denotations of its component expressions. Suppose this is
trle of (1) and (2) in particular. Then whatever the expressions in (1)
a.d (2) contribute to the determination of the sentences' truth values
will just be what the expressions denote in those sentences. This will
be true for, inter alia, the embedded expressions, like 'Tanya' in (1).
What is a sense? It is what an embedded expression contributes to the
determination of the truth value of the attitude attribution in which it
appears. It thus looks as though the only way the embedded
expressions could contribute their senses is by denoting them.
So it appears that there is only one possible answer to my question
'How do embedded expressions contribute their senses to propositional
attitude attributions?'. They denote them. I think it is important to
have another look at the argument, because it seems to me that
something like it provides the underlying motivation for many modern
7. C. f. Evans, G., The Varieties of Reference, Oxford University
Press, 1982, second chapter, and Davidson, D., 'Reality Without
Reference', Dialectica 31, 1977. In my view Davidson makes somewhat
too much of the point.
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Fregean treatments of attitude attributions: that is treatments that have
words inside content sentences denoting their normal senses, rather
than their normal denotations. It seems simple enough: the truth value
of an attribution is a function of, among other things, the senses of
embedded expressions. Since it is also true that the truth value of a
sentence is a function only of the denotations of its components, the
senses of the embedded expressions must, in those contexts, serve as
their denotations.
But the argument is invalid. Consider (3) and (4).
(3) '...e...' (4) '...e'...'
(3) and (4) are schematic representations of opaque attitude
attributions. e and e' have different senses but the same normal
denotations, so (3) may have a different truth value from (4). We may
infer from this, by the Fregean principles, that the denotation of at
least one component expression in (3) differs from that of one
component expression of (4). But it is not entailed that the expressions
that have different denotations must be e and e'. Perhaps, for example,
something else in the complex denotes the sense of e or e'. That would
account for the opacity effects without our having to deny that e and e'
there denote their normal denotations. Or perhaps there is some other,
more devious and complicated manner in which the denotation of some
part of the whole attribution is affected by the senses of the embedded
expressions.
lSo perhaps the right answer to our question is just this. An
expression in a content sentence contributes its sense to the truth
- 16 -
value of the attitude attribution just by having it, and the denotation
of something else in the attribution is affected by it.
There is thus the possibility of using senses to explain the opacity
effects in a manner slightly different from Frege's. But does this idea
get us anywhere? Is there anything interesting to be done with it? That
depends upon whether there is in fact some way of implementing the
proposal, that is, some way of actually doing the semantics. We would
have to find some way of allowing the sense of one expression to be, or
somehow to determine, the denotation of another, a way that
successfully predicts the opacity effects.
One reason why one might feel inclined to search for an alternative
account along those lines is this. There are various ways in which it
appears that expressions even as they are embeddea inside a content
sentence, are denoting their normal denotations. If we could allow the
sense of an embedded expression to affect the truth value of the
attitude report without being the expression's denotation in that
context, then we could leave the expression free to denote its normal
denotation, without losing our account of the failures of substitutivity.
In the next section I shall present some linguistic evidence that
suggests that embedded expressions do denote their normal denotations.
Then I shall investigate how well a Fregean theory might assimilate the
evidence, and whether some alternatives fare better.
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3 The Problem of Anaphora
The linguistic evidence that indicates that embedded expressions
denote their normal denotations comes from cases of cross-denotation
among expressions inside and outside content sentences. The clearest
examples are provided by what appear to be straighforwardly anaphoric
pronouns, like that in (5)
(5) Betty believes that Barbarai is bright,
and she. is bright8
1
In (5) it looks as though 'she' is straightforwardly anaphoric with
'Barbara'. That is to say it looks as though the denotation of 'she' is
determined to be whatever is denoted by its antecedent 'Barbara'. I
have marked this with the subscripts 'iV. On the Fregean theory the
denotation of 'Barbara' in (5) is a sense. But it certainly looks as
though the denotation of 'she' is not a sense, but the person, Barbara.
Assuming that a person cannot be a sense, we have a problem: 'she'
and 'Barbara' cannot denote the same thing, if the one denotes a
person, and the other denotes a sense.
8. 'She is bright' is meant to be outside the scope of 'believes'. In
future examples possible ambiguities are always to be resolved in that
direction, so that the conjunction takes one of its conjuncts outside the




Dummett, notices the problems of apparent coreference among
expressions inside and outside content sentences, like that illustrated in
(5). He offers the following solution on Frege's behalf.
Since the account of opacity effects depends upon assigning a sense
to 'Barbara', that is what we must do. And Dummett wants to preserve
the intuition that (5) contains the semantically monadic predicate (6):
(6) Betty believes that x is bright and x is bright
a predicate that can only be satisfied by a single thing. If that is so,
then the expressions 'Barbara' and 'she', standing in for the place
holders 'x', must have the same denotation. What Dummett denies,
therefore, is that 'she' denotes the person Barbara. Instead it must
denote the sense of the expression 'Barbara', which is the latter
expression's denotation in (5).
The little sentence 'she is bright' in (5) now seems be attributing the
property of being bright to a sense. That cannot be right. Dummett
tries to rectify this by adjusting the semantic values of other things
outside the content sentence, so that overall it ends up with the right
truth conditions.
9. Dummett, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, London,
1973, ch.9.
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Dummett's first suggestion is that we assign to the predicate, 'x is
bright' as it occurs outside the content sentence, a special semantic
value. This special semantic value is a function that maps onto the True
just those senses that are senses of expressions the denotations cf
which are mapped to the True by 'x is bright' in normal contexts.
In general, then, predicates occurring in contexts wherein they
appear outside a content sentence, but are predicated of an expression
the value of which is determined within a content sentence, get special
semantic values. These values are functions mapping onto the True just
those senses that are senses of expressions the denotations of which
are mapped onto the True by the predicate in normal contexts. Now the
utterer of a sentence like (5) will be saying something that is true,
just in case, if I might be so bold as so to put it, what she thought
she was saying was true.
But Dummett finds himself unable to rest with this view. The view
required the assignment of special semantic values to predicates outside
content sentences, in the awkard cases we are considering. But
predicates, like pronouns, bound variables, and subject expressions,
can have their semantic values determined from within a content
sentence.
Suppose that 'John is here and I did not expect that John would be
here' is true. Dummett writes (ibid. p. 276) that from this
we can ... infer 'John is something that I did not expect he
would be' (namely, here), which is to be analyzed as
'(3F)(F(John) and I did not expect that F(John))'.
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And now the argument continues just as before. Predicates outside
content sentences will have to be codenotational with those inside.
Those inside denote th3ir senses, so those outside must denote their
senses as well.
We must conclude that predicates like 'x is a bright', in (5) denote,
in both their occurrences, their senses. But the sense of a predicate is
not its special semantic value. The proposed treatment which depended
upon the assignment of special semantic values must, then, be
abandonned. So, as Dummett says (p. 277) of a context like the second
conjunct of (5):
we have to see the entire context, apparently transparent
but occurring within a sentence in which an opaque context
also occurs, as in reality opaque, with all expressions
contained in it having their indirect reference [=denoting
their senses)
How can the utterer of (5) now say anything at all? Dummett
suggests that we see the whole sentence as prefaced by an implicit
operator such as 'It is true that'. 'That she is bright' just names a
thought, and 'It is true' works as a predicate the semantic value of
which is a function that maps true thoughts onto the True.
What are we to make of this emended Fregean account? I have a
general expression of skepticism, a technical objection, and a
methodological criticism to offer.
4. 1 Criticism of Dummett's Solution
Here is the general expression of skepticism. It is very hard to see
- 21 
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what mechanism could allow for the retroactive effects of future
utterances upon present ones, of the kind Dummett is proposing.
Suppose I say, at t, 'Fred is the smartest student', then, after pausing
to consider the wisdom of my telling this to Fred, I go on to say, at t',
'And he knows that he is the smartest'. Dummett cannot hold off the
conclusion that my initial utterance of 'Fred' denotes its normal sense.
For he is committed to my second utterance being opaque from the
second word onwards. Since the first utterance is linked to the second
one in just the way that spreads opacity, on Dummett's theory, it will
be opaque as well. Suppose, on the other hand, that I had uttered
'Fred is the smartest student', at t, paused to consider the wisdom of
my telling this to Fred, and then had not gone on to say anything
about Fred's psychological states at t'. Well, then of course my
utterance would have been transparent. We have one initial utterance,
at t, compatible with two developments at t'. It is overwhelmingly
natural to think that the semantics of 'Fred is the smartest student' is
completely settled at t. And that is incompatible with the consequences
of Dummett's theory.
There are, of course, many ways in which I can utter an expression
e, ambiguously, then later say something to pin down a denotation for
it. This happens with such mundane sentences as 'Before he spoke the
King cleared his throat'. But it is plausible that the denotation of e is
really determinate at the moment of utterance. All that can happen later
is that the epistemic state of the audience may be improved. Even if 1
utter e with the intention of denoting one thing, a, then change my
mind, and disambiguate so as to make it look as though I meant to
- 22 -
denote another, b, all this could be accounted for in terms of the
epistemic state of the audience. I really denoted a, but brought it
about that my audience thought I was denoting b.
The difficulty, moreover, becomes aggravated: consider the dialogne:
Me: 'Fred is the smartest student'
Other: 'And he knows that he is the smartest'
On Dummett's theory, both tokens of 'he' must denote a sense. But
the first 'he' looks to be arnaphoric to 'Fred'. Is there anything which
prevents our familiar argument from implying that my utterance of 'Fred'
denotes a sense? It appears not. For there is no visible feature of this
case that distinguishes it semantically from the case where I say it all
myself. It is the serial utterance of two parts of the sequence, by
different speakers, which brings about the final predication of Fred.
But I do not see a way of exploiting this so as to allow that 'Fred' and
'he' do not share a dtnotation. For what Other says stands in exactly
the semantic relation to my utterance, as it would have if I had said it.
But surely the denotation of my utterance of 'Fred' cannot depend
upon what Other goes on to say. Such a consequence must make a
reductio ad absurdum of any view from which it issues forth.
A defender of Dummett might respond by suggesting that all
sentences are really composed of an opaque component that names a
thought, and the implicit 'it is true that' operator. If that were so,
then there would be no question of whether a given utterance were
opaque or transparent, which question would have to be settled by
what happened later.
- 23 -
But the reply gives up too much. We can hardly suppose that
expressions never denote ordinary external objects, without losing our
already precarious grip on how we manage to say things the truth of
which depends upon how things are in the world outside. And Dummett
has something very like this point in mind, when he writes (op. cit. p.
198)
The denotation of an expression is its extra-linguistic
correlate in the real world: it is precisely because the
expressions we use have such extra-linguistic correlates
that we succeed in talking about the real world.
Let us move on to my second objection to the Dummettian extension of
Frege. Let
(7) Sandra believed she was going to be late
be uttered by someone other thian Sandra. On Dummett's account
'Sandra', in virtue of its relation to an opaquely embedded 'she', must
denote a sense. But which sense? In (7) 'she was going to be late'
denotes the thought that Sandra believed. Moreover it does so, one
supposes, because each of its components denotes a sense, and the
senses denoted are identical to the senses that compose the thought to
which Sandra is related. So 'she' should denote the sense that stands in
subject position in the thought that Sandra believed. This will not be
the sense of the word 'she', but the sense of the word 'I' in Sandra's
mouth. For Sandra had a first person belief about herself. But 'Sandra'
in someone else's mouth cannot denote that sense.
Dummett might perhaps respond by weakening the theory of
anaphora. The apparent anaphoric relation in (7) and the like would be
- 24 -
reconstructed so that the expressions in question would not denote the
very same Eenses, but would denote senses that present the same
denotation. In (7) 'Sandra' would denote the sense that enables the
speaker to think of Sandra, and 'she' would denote the sense that
featured in Sandra's own thought about herself. But to concede this
would be to undermine the whole Dummettian approach. On this proposal
'...x... A believes --- x--.-' and its fellows would no longer be bona
fide monadic predicates. And once one is prepared to give up anaphora
in these cases, they can be accounted for without the problematic
expedient of assigning indirect denotations to expressions outside
content sentences (see the Kaplanesque proposal, explained below, next
section).
Perhaps neither of my two objections to Dummett are unanswerable.
But even so, the theory looks poor: it is complicated, and the
compliCations (wholesale shifts of denotation, suppressed operators
appearing) seem highly ad hoc. They lack independent motivation.
Contexts outside clauses governed by opacity inducing verbs do not
exhibit the features we would expect of them if they were opaque.
Intersubstitutions of codenotational expressions with different senses,
inside them, preserve truth (try it). The hypothesized wholesale shifts
of denotation thus have no detectible properties.
So let us put aside Dummett's version of the Fregean proposal and
look for something better.
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5 The Kaplanesque Proposal
Let us backtrack to the beginning of Dummiett's story, and see if the
Fregean has other possibilities. The problem was that in (5) it appears
that while 'Barbara' and 'she' are codenotationial, one denotes a sense
and the other denotes a person. Dummett tried to deny that 'she'
denotes a person. But perhaps it is better to deny instead that the two
expressions are really codenotationial. Could it not be that, rather,
they denote things that stand in some special, and specifiable
relationship to each other?
The idea would be to have expressions inside content sentences
denoting senses, but use some relation that holds between those senses
and the expressions' normal denotations, to account for cross-referring.
How would this go?
Let us try (8):
(8) R('Tanya', Tanya)
understanding it to mean something like 'the sense of "Tanya"
represents Tanya'.
We can exploit (8) in a Fregean version of (1):
(9) R('Tanya', Tanya) and Ralph believesd
rTanya is a terrorist
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The corner quotes create an oblique context within which each
expression takes a sense as its semantic value. The corner quoted
'Tanya is a terrorist' now denotes the sense of the sentence 'Tanya is a
terrorist'. 'Believes d ' expresses a two place relation that holds between
believers and the senses or "dicta" of their beliefs.
Anyone familiar with David Kaplan's paper 'Quantifying In'10 will
recognize that I have constructed (9) under its influence. I will call the
kind of treatment illustrated in (9) 'The Kaplanesque proposal'. But
note that Kaplan himself made no such proposal, but used the materials
in another way, for another purpose.
With all this apparatus in play it easy enough to cope with anaphora,
thus
(10) Ralph believes that Tanya. is a terrorist,
1
but she. is too honest
becomes
(11) R('Tanya', Tanya i ) & Ralph believesd
rTanya is a terrorist7 but she, is too honest)
1
with 'shei ' codenotationial with 'Tanya '. One occurrence of 'Tanya' is
within the content sentence, and there serves the Fregean purpose of
denoting a sense, and another occurrence is outside, and allows for the
10. Kaplan, D., 'Quantifying In', in Davidson. D., and Uintikka, J.,
eds., Words and Objections, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969.
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straightforward treatment of anaphora.
I do not think, however, that (11) is a serious candidate for the
logical form of (10). It surely cannot be necessary to have the
expression 'Tanya' occurring no less than three times in a correct
rendition of a sentence in which it occurs only once.
The underlying difficulty with (11) is that it includes the clause (8),
'R('Tanya', Tanya)', and therefore actually says that the sense of the
expression 'Tanya' represents Tanya. This does not seem to be
something that is literally said by the sentence (10). Rather it is the
fact that the sense of 'Tanya' represents Tanya that allows a hearer to
ascertain the correct denotation of the pronoun 'she'. So (10) functions
because (8) is true, but it does not say that it is true.
The sensible course at this stage would be to pull (8) out of (11)
and place it somewhere else in the theory of meaning. As long as (8)
appears in the theory, it can easily be exploited to account for the
anaphora in (10). We would simply take the denotation of 'she' to be,
not the denotation of its antecedent 'Tanya', but the object that is
represented by that denotation.
5.1 Criticism of the Kaplanesque Proposal
But how, exactly, is (8) going to figure in the theory of meaning? It
must either be an axiom, or derivable fromn some axioms. Indeed, if the
representation relation R is to be usable in general, then we need a
method of deriving, for every embedded expression that determines an
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extension, what is represented by the sense of that expression. That
is, we need a general method of obtaining clauses of the form (12):
(12) R(e, b)
where e is an embedded expression and b is the object that the sense
of e represents.
But it is not easy to arrive at these clauses. Consider for example
(13):
(13) John said that he loves [his wife. ] ,1
but he is rude to her.
How are we going get a clause that allows us to recover the
denotation of 'her'? The simple disquotational axiom suggested by (8)
will clearly not work here. What would we do with (14)?
(14) R('his wife', his wife)
'His wife' unlike 'Tanya', does not have a fixed denotation, but will
have its denotation determined by the context. The theory of meaning
thus cannot simply state which object is represented by the sense of
'his wife'. Rather it will have to contain a rule that specifies, for each
context, which object the sense of 'his wife' represents in that context.
And new complexities are presented by quantifier/pronoun
constructions like those illustrated in (15).
(l5)(i) John said he has [some sheepij].
Olga will vaccinate themi .
(ii) John said he has [a new wifei].
You will meet heri .
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Which relation holds between the sense of 'some sheep' in (15)(i), and
the sheep that 'thenm' denotes? And whi-h relation holds between the
sense of 'a new wife' in (15)(ii), and the denotation of 'her'?
I have no doubt that with ingenuity and hard work the dedicated
Fregean could construct the appropriate mechanisms for associating
extensions with senses. But I think that if we reflect upon precisely
what information is required to get us to the right extensions, a
non-Fregean line will appear much more pronising.
In each of our examples the appropriate extension for the anaphoric
pronoun is recoverable from the semantic interpretation that the content
sentence as a whole would have had, had it been treated as
transparent, and given its normal semantic interpretation. Thus 'she' in
(10) denotes what 'Tanya' would have denoted had (10) been
denotationially transparent. And 'her' in (13) denotes what 'his wife'
would have denoted had (13) been transparent.
Similarly in (15)(i) and (ii) the appropriate extensions for the
pronouns would be recoverable from their antecedents, if we gave the
entire content sentences their normal transparent interpretations. For
the theory of meaning will have the resources to recover the right
extensions from transparent treatments of the content sentences, as is
apparent from (16):11
11. For an account of these resources see Evans, G., 'Pronouns,
Quantifiers and Relative Clauses (1)', Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
vii, 1977.
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(16)(i) John has [some sheepi]. Olga will vaccinate themi
(ii) John has [a new wife i J. You will meet her..
Knowledge of what the interpretation of the content sentences would
have been, had they been transparent, is thus sufficient to determine
the extension of the anaphoric pronouns.
It is clear also that in some cases, nothing less than that will do. In
the examples (15) you have to know what the transparent interpretation
of the entire content sentences would have been, before you can figure
out the denotation of the unembedded pronouns. It is impossible to
figure out the extension of 'them' in (15)(i) without first ascertaining
that 'them' denotes some sheep. And you will only figure that out if you
give a transparent interpretation to the expression 'some sheep'.
Moreover you will only figure out that the precise sheep in question are
the ones that John owns if -iou interpret the two expressions 'he' and
'owns' as if they had occurred transparently.
Similar remarks apply to (15)(ii). You will only be able to ascertain
the denotation of 'her' if you interpret each element in the content
sentence as if it occurred transparently.
To account for the anaphora in the sentences (15) what we need to
do is thus precisely equivalent to treating the whole contexts
transparently. Nothing more and nothing less than this is required.
It seems then that rather than attempt to formalize the Kaplanesque
representation relation, R, we should look for some way of accounting
for the failures of substitutivity while yet allowing the embedded
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expressions to denote their normal denotations.
6 Davidson's Account
The point which started off this whole discussion of alternative
proposals, was that if we could allow the denotation of one expression
to be sensitive to the sense of another, then we might be able to use
senses to block the undesirable substitutions, while leaving embedded
expressions free to denote their usual denotations. But how could we do
this?
Donald Davidson's account of the logical form of 'says that' offers a
very attractive answer to this question. Suppose that the logical form
of (1) is really (17):
(17) Ralph believes that. Tanya is a terrorist.
with 'that' as a demonstrative. Davidson himself suggests an
understanding of this that has no use for the notion of sense. In fact
that is one of the main motivations for the proposal. But since we
already have the notion of sense in play, we might as well just have
the 'that' referring to the sense of the embedded sentence 'Tanya is a
terrorist'. Now the opacity effects are easily explained. Since the sense
of 'Tanya is a terrorist' differs from that of 'Patty is a terrorist', Ralph
may believe that
Tanya is a terrorist
but not believe that: Patty is a terrorist
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Since the content sentence is also a sentence in its own right, we
may assign to its component expressions their normal denotations, and
thereby solve our problems with codenotation among expressions inside
and outside content sentences.
Davidson's proposal, even as interpreted in the unDavidsonian
manner, is, as I said, attractive. The reason it is attractive is that it
seerms to read the semantics explicitly off the surface structure, or
very nearly so. On Davidson's account it is easy to see exactly what
each familiar English word is doing, how each contributes to the whole.
But the whole story could not be so simple and elegant. That would
be too much to hope for. And, indeed, Davidson's idea does have
various problems.
6.1 Criticism of Davidson's Account
Davidson's proposal perhaps derives a modicum of prima facie
plausibility from the fact that the indirect discourse 'that' and the
demonstrative 'that' are spelled similarly. But this is quickly dispelled
by noting that in many languages (e. g. the Romance languages) the
complementizer of indirect discourse and the demonstrative have
completely different orthographical and phonetic forms. In some
languages (Japanese, Hebrew, Korean) the complementizer, unlike the
demonstrative, does not even have the superficial form of a separate
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word, but rather of a mere affix. 1 2
In English also, in spite of the orthographical coincidence, the
demonstrative 'that' has a cluster of properties that the 'that' of
'believes that' does not. Notice first that they are pronounced
differently. One usually says
(18) Ralph believes Dat Ortcutt is a spy
shortening the 'that' to •3•'. The demonstrative 'that', however, seems
never to undergo this phonetic reduction, or destressing. One cannot
say 'Hey, look atbat', or:
(19) *Ralph believeshat . Ortcutt is a spy.
which interprets (18) in Davidson's way.
Second, the 'that' of 'believes that' and 'says that' is deletable. One
can say:
(20) Lemmy said he needed money
with the 'that' dropped. But the demonstrative 'that' cannot be dropped.
You cannot say (21)
(21) *Yes ... is what I said
with the 'that' deleted, instead of (22)
(22) Yes that is what I said
12. German and Finnish, on the other hand, are more like English in
the relevant respect.
- 34 -
Now there is not, to my knowledge, any well-understood and
generally accepted explanation of what determines the possibilities of
deletion and destressing. But it is very plausible that, in both cases,
the explanation will invoke the semantic role of the expressions
involved. It looks as though the reason why one cannot delete the
demonstrative pronoun 'that' is precisely because it has an important
referring function. And I believe that similar remarks apply to the
phonological characteristics. Stress often goes with semantic role; and it
is hard to see what else could account for the stressing rules in this
13
case.
Although these objections, taken by themselves, are far from
conclusive, they are very well worth noticing, for they provide an
example of how semantics can interact with other parts of linguistics.
The 'that' of 'says that' can be deleted and destressed, the English
demonstrative pronoun cannot. This is simply empirical data. If it is
true that the 'that' of 'says that' functions semantically like a
demonstrative, as Davidson holds, then it must be false that what
explains the phonological and syntactic facts is semantic role. Whether
this is so or not is an empirical question at the intersection of the
various parts of linguistics. The examples provide a nice demonstration
of methodological liberalism at work, and point towards a rich field of
evidence that may help us choose between competing semantic theories,
13. For a discussion of these and other syntactic difficulties with
Davidson's proposal, see Speas, M., and Segal, G., 'On Saying jt ',
in Mind and Language, 1986.
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should we have such aspirations.
Another, and more serious difficulty with Davidson's proposal is that
the English sentences do not, in important respects, behave
semantically as they would if they were paratactic. Thus
(23) Everyone said that they loved their mothers
is open to two interpretations. It could mean that each person said
something like 'They loved their mothers', where 'they' is not anaphoric
with (or bound by) 'Everyone', but refers to some other group of
individuals. But it can also be readily understood as
(24) Everyonei said that theyi loved their mothers
(24) means that each person claimed of herself that she loved her
mother (saying something like 'I love my mother'). But the Davidsonian
rendition of (23)
(25) Everyone said that. They loved their mothers.
is only interpretable in the first way. (Imagine someone pointing to an
inscription of 'They loved their mothers' on a blackboard, and saying
'Everyone said that!'. How would you interpret this?) 14
The point of the example is not that Davidson could not define a
samsaying relation that would allow (25) to mean the same as (24). It is
that (23) is not, as a matter of empirical fact, understood by English
14. This kind of example is due to Higginbotham, J., 'Linguistic Theory
and Davidson's Program in Semantics', in LePore, E., ed., The
Philosophy of Donald Davidson: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985.
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speakers as we would expect if Davidson's analysis were correct.
The empirical evidence against Davidson's proposal is not conclusive.
But it is good enough evidence to warrant a continuation of our search
for a satisfactory account of our problematic pieces of language. 15
7 Higginbotham's Account
What we were looking for was some way of making the denotation or
extension of some part of the attitude attribution depend upon the
senses of the embedded expressions, without having to deny that those
expressions denote their normal denotations. We found that the
suggested simple solution of just having the 'that' denoting the senses
was not entirely satisfactory. But another way of doing it is suggested
by Higginbotham (op. cit.).
The proposal is that we assign values to expressions only relative to
the larger expressions of which they form a part. So, in general, if we
have an expression e inside a larger expression, say a sentence, S,
instead of assigning to e a value all by itself, we assign to e a value
relative to S. The point of this is that since an expression may
simultaneously appear in several different embedding expressions, we
15. There are also objections to Davidson that concern the logical
properties of 'says that' sentences. These sentences appear to have
implications that they would not, if their logical form were paratactic.
For a recent example see Burge, T., 'On Davidson's "Saying That"', in
LePore ed. op. cit.
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may assign to it a value relative to one that differs from the value, if
any, that we assign to it relative to another.
This idea of assigning values only relative to embedding expressions
is useful not just for attitude attributions, but can solve problems with
sentences of a completely different kind.16 This is important. If it were
not so, then we would be introducing sweeping changes in the semantic
theory, changes that affected what we said about every sentence, just
to cope with the special problems with attitude attributions. If that
happened, one might suspect that the cure was more radical than the
disease required.
The success of the proposal may ultimately depend upon just this. If
the trick of making assignments of values relative to embedding
expressions proves fruitful in a range of different cases, that will
vindicate its use here. If on the other hand it idles, and simply makes
other areas needlessly cumbersome, that may cast doubt upon it.
Let us see how the idea applies to belief attributions. Consider (1)
'Ralph believes that Tanya is a terrorist', carved up as in (26):
(26) [S1Ralph believes [S,that [soTanya is a
terrorist] ] ]
(26) is articulated into the three phrases, S O, embedded in S', which
is in turn embedded in Sl
16. Specifically, certain sentence connectives, such as 'if' and 'unless',
express different truth functions in different linguistic environments.
See Hligginbotham op. cit.
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In order to cope with cross-denotation we want expressions inside
content sentences to have their normal denotations. So we treat the
parts of the content sentence SO, 'Tanya is a terrorist' relative to SO
itself as if it were unembedded, and appeared in isolation. This means
that the expressions inside the content sentence just get their normal
denotations as desired. This is expressed in (27). (I have significantly
altered Higginbotham's notation, for ease of assimilation).
(27) (i) <'Tanya', SO> denotes Tanya
(ii) (Va)(a satisfies <'x is a terrorist', S0 > iff a is
a terrorist)
from which it is easy to derive
(iii) <SO , SO> is true iff Tanya is a terrorist
The angle brackets are to be taken literally, so that we are technically
assigning values to ordered pairs of expressions. But intuitively we can
just understand <'Tanya', S0> to mean, "'Tanya" considered relative to
SO '
Now we look at S', 'that Tanya is a terrorist' and consider its role
relative to the large sentence S1, 'Ralph believes that Tanya is a
terrorist'. S', considered relative to S i , appears as the object of the
verb 'believes'. Higginbotham (following Harmanl ) takes the objects of
propositional attitudes to be or to be objects "similar to" interpreted
logical forms. Since, for Higginbotham, the objects to which semantic
17. Harman, G., 'Deep Structure as Logical form', in Harman and
Davidson eds., op. cit.
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values get assigned are themselves logical forms, the 'that' clause is
taken to be true of things that are similar to itself. Similarity is used
in conscious imitation of Davidson's samesaying relation: two things will
be similar to each other if they have the same or similar semantic
features. The role of the content sentence may be expressed by
(27)(iv):
(27)(iv) (Va)(a satisfies <S', S > iff a is similar to S O)
(iv) together with (v):
(v) <'Ralph', S I > denotes Ralph
and
(vi) (Va)(Vb)( <a, b> sats <'x believes y', SI> iff a
believes b)
along with simple interpretation rules give us (vii)
(vii) <S I , SI> is true iff (3a)(a is similar to
SO and Ralph believes a)
(vii) is a T-sentence that tells us, more or less, that S I , the sentence
'Ralph believes that Tanya is a terrorist' is true iff Ralph believes
something similar to the sentence 'Tanya is a terrorist'.
Higginbotham's treatment has embedded expressions denoting their
normal denotations. This provides a simple solution to the problem of
anaphora that we have been looking at.
Let us return to our example (10), 'Ralph believes that Tanya i is a
terrorist, but she. is too honest', now constructed as (28):1
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(28) [SI Ralph believes that (SO Tanyai is a terroristiI
but S2 shei is too honest)
The challenge was to find some way of getting the unembedded 'she.'
in S 2 to denote Tanya, so that S 2 can get its correct truth conditions.
Thus all we need to do is to find some pair <x, y> such that the
denotation of x considered relative to y, is Tanya; as expressed in
(29):
(29) Den<x, y> = Den<'shei', S2> = Tanya
But this is now no problem. 'Tanya' considered relative to the content
sentence, will just get its normal denotation. So we have (30):
(30)(i) Den<'Tanyai', S >=Tanya
(ii) Den<'she ', S 2 >=Den<'Tanyai', S0>
So Qiii) Den<'shei', S2>=Tanya
The aspect of the theory that provides embedded expressions with
their normal denotations seems to be satisfactory. However the other
aspect of the theory, the one that is supposed to account for the
failures of substitutivity, is less so. How are these failures to be
explained?
7.1 Criticism of Higginbotham's Account
'Ralph believes that Tanya is a terrorist' is true, but 'Ralph believes
that Patty is a terrorist' is false. Higginbotham's account allows for this
easily enough. The content sentence, considered relative to its
embedding attitude report, is treated as a predicate true of things
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similar to itself. The content sentences 'Tanya is a terrorist' and 'Patty
is a terrorist' are not similar to each other and obviously might fail to
be similar to the same things. Since each is true of things similar to
itself, they will then be true of different things. One may be similar
to, and so true of, Ralph's belief content, while the other is not.
It seems to me that the explanation of the failures of substitutivity is
not quite satisfactory. The two content sentences 'Tanya is a terrorist'
and 'Patty is a terrorist' are treated, relative to their embedding
attitude report, as predicates. They are predicates with different
extensions: that is what accounted for the opacity effects. But the
predicates are composed of expressions that have, on Higginbotham's
theory, the same denotations. For the counterpart expressions inside
the two content sentences will always get the same values. Relative to
the content sentences, they are assigned their normal values, so
codenotational expressions continue to share their denotation. And
relative to the belief report as a whole they are not assigned values at
all: only the whole content sentence gets a value relative to the larger
sentence. Thus the extension of the content sentences considered as
predicates does not depend upon the values of their parts.
Now, the departure from compositionality taken by itself, need not be
a failing. There is no a priori reason to believe that semantics for a
real natural language will everywhere be compositional.18
18. C. f. Hintikka, J., 'A Note on Anaphoric Pronouns and Information
Processing by Humans', Linguistic Inquiry, 1987, p. 116, and the
reference there cited.
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Compositionality is one kind of explanation of how it is that we may
understand a new sentence that is built up, in known ways, from
known parts. There may be other ways in which to explain our
knowledge of how the extension of new complex predicates is built up
from old simple parts. But some such account needs to be offered for
the particular case of content sentences, as treated by Higginbotham, if
the violation of compositionality is not to matter.
At this juncture it will be well to reflect upon why the failure of
compositionality does not afflict Davidson.
Davidson's samesaying relation is not invoked within the theory of
meaning to explain the extension of any expression. For him every
element in the whole attitude attribution has its extension determined by
some antecedently available part of the theory of meaning. The content
sentence is treated only as a sentence in its own right. It is not a
predicate true of other things that samesay with it. Consequently
compositionality is not violated.
Moreover Davidson has an acceptable explanation of how samesaying
is supposed to work. 19 Davidson uses samesaying only as a relation
among utterances and inscriptions. If I say that Galileo said that the
Earth moves, then samesaying relates my utterance of the content
19. The best source is his 1976 paper, 'Reply to Foster', reprinted in
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 1984.
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sentence to a similar sort of thing. To arrive at something that
samesays with Galileo's utterance one proceeds as follows. Take Galileo's
utterance. Construe it as an articulated linguistic structure of Italian.
Apply to it a theory of meaning (for Italian, in English). This theory
will deliver English sentences that have the same truth conditions as
the Italian one. Now, there will be various different ways of stating the
conditions under which Galileo's utterance is true, differences among
which will be too subtle for the theory of meaning to note. But among
these options will be soine that are better suited to capturing the
flavour of Galileo's utterance; more 17th centu y Italy, less 20th
century Anierica. Those suitably flavoured ways of stating the truth
conditions of Galileo's utterance samesay with it.21
Higginbotham thus departs from Davidson in two ways. First, he
writes samesaying into the theory of meaning itself, as a relation that
gives the extension of certain complex predicates. And second, he
treats samesaying as a relation among abstracta, not Fregean thoughts
exactly, but "interpreted logical forms".
The second departure creates two lacunae that need filling. First, we
know what it is to utter an utterance, but we lack an account of what
20. It is thus no accident that Davidson has never offer d an account
of the logical form of 'believes' sentences. Samesaying needs relata, and
Davidson refuses to recognize any analogue of an utterance, in the case
of belief. For an explicit avowel of this refusal see his 'Knowing One's
Own Mind', Presidential Address delivered before the Sixtieth Annual
Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1986.
21. I am indebted to Bruce Vermazen for my understanding of
samesaying.
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it is to believe a logical form. So when similarity is used to account for
the extension of a content sentence, we lack, even in principle, a way
of determining which specific objects it relates. One logical form is
provided by the content sentence itself, as the theory treats it, but
where is the other one? And, second, we know what it is for two
utterances to samesay, but we lack an account of what it is for two
logical forms to samesay.
The first departure from Davidson means that until the lacunae are
filled, the semantics is radically incomplete. For 'samesaying' appears as
a technical expression in the theory of meaning. It is an expression
that is crucial to the account of how the semantic features of complex
expressions depends upon their structure and the semantic features of
their parts. The theorist of meaning thus cannot leave it unexplicated.
I do not claim that the required fillers of the lacunae are not be
found. But I recommend a different course.
8 Frege Vindicated?
Let us collapse the number of logical forms in play clown to one.
Instead of trying to relate, as separate things, the logical form that
Galileo believes, to the logical form of the content sentence 'The Earth
moves', let us suppose that Galileo believes that very logical form. 2 2 We
22. This was Harman's original idea, as I understand it.
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may thus take a second step back towards Frege (the first, taken by
Higginbotham, was mentioned four paragraphs back) and treat the
content sentence (still relative to the embedding report, of course) as a
singular term, rather than a predicate.
And, since we are in the mood for a retreat towards Frege, we might
as well try a third step. Let us assign to each semantically simple
expression in the content sentence a sense as its denotation. Embedded
complex expressions, including the whole content sentences, will then
denote logical forms (their own) in which inhere senses. The extension
of a content sentence, considered as a singular term, will thus be a
function of the denotations of its component expressions (senses), and
its structure: compositionality regained.
We are still left with a problem similar to that of saying what it is to
believe an interpreted logical form. We now have to say what it is to
believe a thought, a logical structure of senses.
But we need not hurry to answer the question, since it no longer
plays an important role in the semantics. There is just a relation that is
denoted by the expression 'believes', a primitive and unanalyzed part of
the content of the familiar idiom of belief reporting. Our problem was to
explain how the semantic features of complex expressions depended
upon those of their parts. We never promised to give philosophical
theories of every primitive semantic value that we came across.23
23. These remarks echo Davidson's defence of his use of the samesaying
relation. See 'On Saying That' p. 104, of Inquiries into Truth and
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So my suggestion is that instead of the unhelpful (27)(iv) we write
(31):
(31) (i) <'Tanya', Sl> denotes rTanya
(ii) <'is a terrorist', S1> denotes is a terrorist
I assume that S' just inherits the value of S O considered relative to
Sl
. 
This gives us (iii):
(iii> <S', Si> denotes rTanya is a terroristp
the corner quotes once again signalling that the expressions inside them
denote senses, rather than their normal denotations. (31)(iii) together
with the original (27)(v) and (vi) suffice to yield (29)
(32) <Si , SI> is true iff Ralph believes rTanya is a
terrorist7
That is to say 'Ralph believes that Tanya is a terrorist' is true iff
Ralph believes the thought that Tanya is a terrorist. So the opacity
effects are explained in Frege's original way, by each embedded
expression denoting a sense. But since we also have those very same
expressions denoting their normal denotations, as expressed in (27)(1)
and (ii), we can easily account for the appearance that embedded
expressions denote their normal denotations. They appear to because
that is just what they do.
Of course it would be rash to put a great deal of faith in the sketch
Interpretation, and the references cited thereat.
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of the account I have just offered. We need to see how it extends to
more complicated cases, how well or badly it captures desirable
inferences, and so on and so forth. And we need to spell out the
mechanics of the proof of the T-sentences: a task that quickly leads
into difficulties with Frege's hierarchy. And perhaps most importantly,
we had better be prepared to investigate whether anything could play
the theoretical role that we have assigned to senses, and if so, what
sort of thing this would be.
I confess to a moderate degree of optimism about each problem.
Optimism about all the problems, however, would be supererogatory.
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PAPER TWO
WHO'S AFRAID OF NARROW MINDS?
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The mind is its own place
- John Milton
Who's Afraid of Narrow Minds?
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that all of the
propositional attitudes that we ascribe to one another in our everyday
folk psychology are possessed of what has come to be called 'narrow
content'. The defence will by no means be complete, since I shall
neither be attempting to meet all varieties of objection to the view, nor
offering positive arguments in its favour. Rather I shall be concerned
to fend off one major source of opposition to it. This opposition comes
from Gareth Evans , and John McDowell.2
In this section I shall give a brief general introduction to the
dispute. In the remaining sections I shall deal with Evans' and
McDowell's objections to my view.
1. Evans, G., The Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press,
1982.
2. McDowell, J.,'The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name' ('SRPN') in
Platts, M., ed. Reference, Truth and Reality, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1980; 'De Re Senses' ('DRS'), in Synthese, 1986; 'Criteria,
Defeasibility and Knowledge' ('CDK'), Proceedings of the British
Academy, 68, 1982. Evans and McDowell appear to hold the same view,
down to a detailed level. The leading idea originates with McDowell.
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1.1 Background
In the last fifteen years or so a certain thesis about reference,
largely owed to Kripke3 and Putnam,4 has become popular.
The view, which I call the 'direct reference' view, is that certain
expressions are "extension-dependent". An expression is
extension-dependent if its meaning depends upon its extension. So if
'Sandy' and 'Mandy' are extension-dependent, and refer to numerically
different (even if type-identical) individuals, they have different
6
meanings. And if 'Sandy' had referred to Mandy, it would have meant
something other than what it actually does mean.
A similar thesis is applied to natural kind terms. But here the
meaning of the expression depends not upon which actual things happen
to fall under it, but upon the type to which those things belong.
There are two attitudes that the proponent of the direct reference
view might take towards empty extension-dependent expressions.
3. Kripke, S., Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, 1979.
4. See e.g, Putnam, H., 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' in his Mind
Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
5. 1 think the term 'extension-dependent' is owed to Wiggins.
6. Different extensions are sufficient for different meanings, but may
not be necessary. It is open to the direct reference theorist to hold
that two extension-dependent expressions with the same extensions may
yet have different meanings. McDowell and Evans do hold this, see
below section 4).
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'Mandy' when empty certainly does not have the same extension as
'Mandy' when it refers to a genuine Mandy. This entails, on the direct
reference view, at least that empty extension-dependent expressions do
not have the same meaning as do non-empty ones. One might hold that
an empty 'Mandy' has a different meaning from the name of a Mandy,
properly so-called. McDowell and Evans, however, hold the stronger
thesis that empty extension-dependent expressions have no meaning.
1.2 Conceptions of Content
It seems natural to take the direct reference view to apply to
concepts as well as to expressions of language. Doing so, we arrive at
the idea that which content a given concept has will depend upon what
it refers to.
The extension of the direct reference view from words to concepts is
encouraged by the tight connections that we find between the contents
of propositional attitudes and the sentences that we use to express and
report them. If 'Sandy' and 'Mandy' have different meanings, then we
would expect the beliefs they may be used to express, or report, to
have different contents. (Indeed, on some views an expression's
7. Terminological matters. A concept is a thought component. A thought
is a psychological correlate of an interpreted sentence: it is a
syntactically structured object and it has a content (or some contents)
which may or may not be essential to it. Thoughts are the objects of
propositional attitudes; they may be believed, doubted, desired-true
etc. 'Content' has to be understood more or less intuitively. It covers
at least semantic coiitent and phenomenal content, but claims that there
are other sorts of content are to be regarded as at least intelligible.
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meaning is to be identified with its role in expressing beliefs; in which
case the extension of the direct reference view from language to
thought would be automatic.) So the belief that Sandy is sullen would
have a different content from the belief that Mandy is sullen. And if
'Sandy' has no referent, and so no meaning, then 'Sandy is sullen'
cannot be used to express, or report, a belief. And this suggests that
the belief that Sandy is sullen depends for its existence on its object,
Sandy.
We might hypothesize that the mental states have two kinds of
characteristics. One of these kinds of characteristic would be
determined, at least in part, by things outside the head. The second
kind of characteristic would be logically independent of anything outside
the subject. Properties of this second kind would be insensitive to
variations of the subject's surrounding environment: to them it would
not matter whether there were a world outside the subject, nor, if
there were, what it was like.
Characteristics of the first kind, if there are any, endow
psychological states with what has come to be called 'wide content';
those of the second kind, if there are any, provide narrow content. I
call McDowell's and Evans' view the 'Wide Content Only' ('WCO') view.
On the WCO view some psychological states have only wide contents. If
the belief that Mandy is morose is such a state, then that belief has no
narrow content. The only content it has is of the kind that requires
the existence of its object, Mandy. No Mandy, no wide content; no wide
content, no content at all.
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For McDowell and Evans it is thus no accident that our specifications
of psychological states are bound up as they are with the objects of
those states. When the best description of a psychological state makes
mention of the state's object, this is because what it is for a subject to
be in the state essentially involves her being related to that object. So
if one is to believe that Mandy is morose, one has to stand in a certain
relation to Mandy herself.
The view that I shall defend, the "Narrow Content Also" (NCA)
view, is that all propositional attitudes have a narrow content. So the
belief that Mandy is morose has a content that is not Mandy-dependent.
The belief that Mandy is morose perhaps has a wide content as well as
a narrow one. Removal of Mandy would eliminate that. But one would be
left with a belief endowed with a definite content nevertheless.
The existence of narrow content would be the existence of something
that simultaneously performs two separate tasks. The first accounts for
its narrowness. If Zippy thinks Zonker is zany, then the narrow
content of his mental state must be that much of it that is within
Zippy.
8
Suppose that Zippy's concept, Zonker, refers to Zonker. This would
be the upshot of a combination of factors. Some of these will lie outside
Zippy: for example, certain relations crossing the gap in space and time
8. My use of the underlining device is to be understood as an attempt
to do something that is as much like quoting concepts and thoughts as
is possible.
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between thinker and object of thought, that make it the case that when
Zippy thinks some thought of the form Zonker is F, his thought will be
true iff Zonker, in particular, is F. But these external relations cannot
by themselves be all that is required to let Zippy think of Zonker.
Presumably there are also important contributions made at Zippy's end
of the chain. It is a task of the concept's narrow content to make such
contributions. The concept's narrow content is thus determined by those
of its properties that are entirely independent of any links of the chain
that are outside Zippy.
The second task for narrow content is more nebulous in nature.
Narrow content must deserve its name, and be recognizably content. It
is not obvious what performance of this task entails. But for me narrow
content is, at least, what gives a subject's perspective, or subjective
point of view. The narrow content of a belief is the way in which the
world is presented by the belief to its subject. Sandy's belief that
Mandy is trendy makes the world appear a certain way from Sandy's
perspective; which way that is depends only upon the belief's narrow
content. Narrow content alone must suffice to provide something that
should be counted as a subjective point of view.
The espousal of a theory that makes room for narrow content is
partly motivated, at least in my case, by the intuition that the mind is,
to put it suggestively, essentially inner. A subject's point of view of
the world, I believe, is properly thought of as intrinsically independent
of the world of which it is a point of view. It should depend only upon
how things are with the subject, considered in abstraction from her
'p
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environment. For the friend of narrow content, then, specifications of
points of view that make mention of external objects, must be
specifications exploiting merely accidental features of what they specify.
The WCO theorist is skeptical that the two tasks set for narrow
content are always performed, or even performable, by a single thing.
The WCO theorist holds that the concepts that are ascribed by
extension-dependent terms do not have narrow content. For what
determines the reference of such concepts is mostly outside the head
and independent of the mind. 9
On the WCO view, what there is in the head that corresponds to
these concepts does not, considered in isolation from its surroundings,
have anything that should be called 'content'. It cannot by itself, in the
absence of its relations to an external referent, count as a component
of a point of view.
Although I think that the main underlying motivation for the WCO
view is the idea that the internal component of a putative
extension-dependent concept is too exiguous a thing to be endowed with
9. C. f. Burge, ('Belief De Re', The Journal of Philosophy LXXIV,
1977), who writes 'features of the mental entity itself ... are not always
sufficient to pick out the relevant object' in these cases '[f]actors which
determine the objects about which the believer holds his beliefs ... are
appropriately counted nonconceptual - indeed, in most cases,
noncognitive.' Oxi his view what determines reference is independent of
the mind in the strong sense of not being part of its cognitive domain.
McDowell (DRS, see also CDK) takes issue with this. For him the mind's
cognitive reach extends to include those factors that are literally (but
not metaphorically) outside the head. For him, the independence of
these factors thus consists only in the fact that they would exist, even
if the mind within which they were located, did not.
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content, I shall not have a great deal to say about the idea explicitly.
The worry is rarely articulated very fully, and so it is hard to know
what, exactly, would be required to alleviate it. I shall take up one
statement of the concern in section 6, below, and argue that it is
misconceived. I shall enter some intuitive considerations that indicate
that what is ensconced entirely within the head is really content. Any
more than that would require a theory of narrow content. Once such a
theory was provided then it might be possible more seriously to take up
the question of whether or not what is narrow is also content.
I think that rather than launching into the development and defence
of such a theory, it will prove more fruitful to fend off a priori (and a
posteriori, for which see my 'Seeing What is not There') objections to
the plausible and natural view that there is something there to have a
theory of.
With that end in mind, I shall be focussing on a patrticular expression
of the WCO view, that McDowell gives (in SRPN). We are to suppose
that a researcher is interested in the ways of a jungle tribe. He learns
that the locals use the word 'Mumbo-Jumbol as the name of one of their
Gods. Not being of similar faith, he concludes, rightly we shall
suppose that the name has no beArer.
If a native says something that intuitively has the English translation
'Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder', then, McDowell holds, the interpreter
should not use attributions of the belief that Mumbo-Jumbo brings
thunder to help explain the native's actions - including those actions
that are the utterings of sentences containing 'Mumbo-Jumbo'. For,
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according to McDowell (ibid. p. 153) 'no belief is expressed by his
words'. There just is no such belief as the belief that Mumbo-Jumbo
brings thunder. And, for the most part, the same is view is taken of
other empty proper names: they cannot be used in content sentences
that express or ascribe beliefs.10 So the existence of thoughts ascribed
by content sentences in which proper names feature, depends upon the
existence of a bearer for the name: no bearer, no thought.
I shall be dealing with what I take to be four distinct arguments that
11
are offered in support of the WCO view. These arguments are not
explicitly distinguished, but appear all run together in a dense couple
of pages of SRPN, and the last, and most interesting, is supplemented
in detail elsewhere. Evans' contributions are gathered from different
places in his book. Interpretation is therefore difficult, and it is
possible that they would not wish to be associated with all of the
arguments I attribute to them. We shall consider the arguments in
ascending order of depth and plausibility.
10. There may be exceptions, but these have special features that set
them apart from typical proper names. See section 4) below.
11. Two additional arguments are to be found in Evans' book. I have
not dealt with these because I have relatively little to add to
Blackburn's response to them; for which see Blackburn, S., Spreading




The native says something that intuitively has the translation
'Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder'.
Here is what appears to be a brief, almost self-contained argument
(McDowell ibid.):
No belief is expressed by his words: they purport to
express a belief which could be described in the
transparent style, but since no appropriate belief could be
thus described, there is no such belief as the belief they
purport to express.
A belief describable in the transparent style is a belief concerning
some object, that it satisfies some property. On McDowell's view it is
only such beliefs that are attributed by content sentences with proper
names.
I am not sure that McDowell really intends the quoted words to
express an argument. But, in case he does, I respond.
2.1 Reply to First Argument
The argument would seem to proceed as follows. First premise: the
words purport to express a belief that could be described in the
transparent style. Second premise: no appropriate belief could be so
described. Therefore, subconclusion: there is no such belief as the
belief the words purport to express. Therefore, conclusion: there is no
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belief that they express.
I have two objections. The first is to the first premise. What does it
mean to say that the words 'purport to express a belief which could be
described in the transparent style'? I think the most that can
reasonably be purportedly purported is that there is a belief, ihe belief
is expressed by the words, and the belief is describable in the
transparent style.
McDowell, however, thinks otherwise:
When one sincerely and assertively utters a sentence
containing a proper name ... one does not mean to be
expressing a belief whose availability to be expressed is
indifferent to the existence or non-existence of a bearer for
the name.
Were this true, then the words of the native's utterance would
purport to express a belief that not only was describable in the
transparent style, but that was so essentially. But McDowell has no
right to claim this.
Surely enough, if one utters a sentence containing a proper name,
one is, in the normal case anyway, committing oneself to the existence
of its bearer. But that is explained by the truth of one's utterance
being dependent on this ontological fact. There is no warrant for the
claim that it is written into lay beliefs, or somehow implicit in lay
practice that one takes not just the truth, but the very existence, of
one's singular beliefs to depend upon the existence of referents for
words used to express them. Those less concerned with philosophical
theories than we are, including perhaps McDowell's native, are not up
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12to their necks, knowingly or otherwise, in the WCO view.
The second premise, that no appropriate belief could be described in
the transparent style, is true.
The subconclusion, that there is no such belief as the belief the
words purport to express would follow, perhaps, if the first premise
were interpreted in the strong form that McDowell seems to intend.
Then, perhaps, we could think of the native as committed to the
principle: either I express a transparently describable belief, or I
express no belief. If, on the other hand, we interpret it as I
suggested, thus allowing it to be true, then what follows is merely;
there is no belief that has the property that the purportedly expressed
belief is purported to have. It does not follow that there is no belief
purportedly expressed by the words.
My second objection is to the move from the subconclusion to the
conclusion. What McDowell really needs to show is that no belief is
actually expressed by the words. But this in no way follows from what
he has so far argued. It is not in general true that what is expressed
must also be purportedly expressed. Why should it be true in this
case?
12. Since McDowell's claim is undefended and prima facie implausible, I
do not undertake a defence of my opposed opinion. Were such to be
offered, it would be built around the frequent and unabashed uses of
empty proper names in descriptions of others' beliefs, that we indulge
in. Normal people do not have the sense that it is literally impossible to
believe that Santa Claus has a white beard, whether or not he exists.
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Even if McDowell did intend the rather feeble argument we have been
discussing, he certainly would not want his WCO view to rest on it. So
let us move on.
3 Second Argument
Here is an official defence of the WCO view (ibid.):
13
The non-Fregean [=WCO] view can be defended on these
lines. An interpreter's ascription of propositional attitudes
to his subject is in general constrained by the facts (as the
interpreter sees them). This is partly because
intelligibility, in ascriptions of belief at least, requires
conformity to reasonable principles about how beliefs can be
acquired under the impact of the environment; and partly
because the point of ascribing propositional attitudes is to
bring out the reasonableness, from a strategic standpoint
constituted by possession of the at'itudes, of the subject's
dealings with the environment. Now, whether a name has a
bearer or not (in an interpreter's view) makes a difference
to the way in which the interpreter can use beliefs he can
ascribe to the subject in making sense of the subject's
behaviour. A sincere assertive utterance containing a name
with a bearer can be understood as expressing a belief
correctly describable as belief, concerning the bearer that
it satisfies some specified condition. If the name has no
bearer (in the interpreter's view), he cannot describe any
suitably related belief in that transparent style.
What follows the above quotation is a comment about what, perhaps,
an interpreter could glean from the utterance of a sentence with an
empty proper name, given that it has no sense. Then comes the brief
13. When McDowell calls the view 'Non-Fregean' he has in mind Frege's
famous claim in 'On Sense and Reference' that the thought that
Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep 'remains the same
whether "Odysseus" has reference or not'.
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argument I considered in the last subsection. Neither of these sequentia
adds to the argument begun by the words in the long quote. Can we,
then, reconstruct, from those words, an argument for the non-Fregean
view? Perhaps the following.
The argument begins with a statement of the principle of charity.
The ascription of attitudes is constrained by what the external facts are
taken to be, in general, so that we can ascribe beliefs and behaviours
that make sense in the light of those facts, to whatever extent is
possible (possible, perhaps, relative to certain other constraints). When
a name has a bearer, we can attribute beliefs expressed by utterances
containing the name, and use these attributions to make sense of the
actions in a special way. The special way involves taking the the belief
to be describablel4 transoarently.
Perhaps McDowell would say that in these cases we can see the
subject's truck with the environment as directly guided by that
environment. We can interpret his actions by ascribing attitudes that
involve special cognitive rapports with those parts of the environment
with which he interacts. Such rapports are logically dependent, for
their existence, upon their objects.
But then, the conclusion would be, these attitudes, which are
necessarily describable in the transparent mode, must be distinct from
14. 'Describable', not 'described'. The point is that the belief is taken
to be about a particular object. It may be so taken even when
described by a content sentence in which intersubstitutions are not
truth-preserving.
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any attitudes not so describable. Such attitudes are simply not available
in the absence of an object.
3.1 Reply to Second Argument
If that is the argument, then it is vulnerable to the following
objection. There is no valid rii.ve from the premise that the existence of
an object for the attitude is requ.ired for the availability of a certain
sort of description of the attitude, to the conclusion that the object is
required for the availability of the attitude itself. It might be true that
the existence of an object allows us to describe an attitude by relating
it to an object with which the subject is intimate, without it being true
that the very same attitude could not be described in another way, a
way that made no mention of the object. To show otherwise McDowell
would have to argue that the attitude itself was dependent upon the
object: and that is exactly the point of dispute.
The existence of descriptions of a subject's mind that make mention of
particular objects provides no evidence for the existence of a special
class of object-involving attitudes. This is true no matter how useful
these descriptions might be, for the interpretation of the subject's
actions. The question is whether what makes true a transparent
description may correctly be seen as composed of an
extension-independent attitude of the subject's and an external object to
which it stands in some particular relation. Nothing in McDowell's
argument suggests a negative answer to this question.
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4 Third Argument
The third argument to be found in Evans and McDowell results from
their conception of the proper form for a theory of sense.
Their idea, one which I applaud, is that a Davidsonian theory of
meaning may serve as a theory of sense. Such a theory will have
machinery to derive, for each sentence of the object language, a
T-sentence of the familiar form 'S is true iff p': 'S' would be replaced
by a structure-revealing description of an object-language sentence,
and 'p' by a statement, in the meta-language, of that sentence's truth
conditions. The machinery will include clauses that assign semantic
values to simple expressions of the object language, and clauses that
allow for the computation of the semantic values of complex expressions,
on the basis of those of their parts. What the theory actually explicitly
states, then, is what expressions denote. But the theory may yet serve
as a theory of sense, if in saying what the denotation of an expression
is, it does so in a way that displays, or reveals, the expression's
sense.
McDowell and Evans hold that proper names should be dealt with by
clauses of the form:
(1) 'a' stands for A
where 'A' has the same sense as 'a'. Such a clause, McDowell says
(ibid. p. 143, c.f. also Evans, op. cit. p. 35) 'gives - or more
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strictly, in that context, as good as gives - the sense of the name'.
That context is a theory of meaning that delivers T-sentences capable
of doing their bit in making sense of the linguistic actions of
object-language speakers. The clause explicitly says only that 'a' stands
for A. That is something that might equally be expressed by the
clause:
(2) 'a' stands for B
where 'B' has the same referent as 'a', but a quite different sense. But
only the first clause correctly shows the sense of 'a'. In this way a
theory that includes the first clause may suffice, if understood .
correctly, as a theory of sense. It so suffices because of what it
shows, not what it says.
On a theory of meaning that gives the senses of proper names in
McDowell's suggested manner, there is no giving of the senses of
proper names that lack a referent. For the honest interpreter cannot
enter into her theory of meaning the clause:
(3) 'Mumbo-Jumbo' stands for Mumbo-Jumbo
nor any other clause of the suggested form, for an empty proper name.
McDowell does not say why the interpreter cannot accept (3), but the
reason is obvious. (3) entails: (3y)('Mumbo-Jumbo' stands for y), which
the interpreter must take to be false.
If this is the right way to go about things, then empty Froper names
can have no senses; the moral that McDowell draws.
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Evans (ibid. pps. 25-7) appears to make much the same argument.
He points out that a clause of the form of (1)
identifies the semantic value of the name in a way which
shows, or displays, its sense. When a theory of semantic
value meets this condition quite generally we may say that
it can serve as a theory of sense ... This conception of
the relation between Fregean theories of sense and of
semantic value is attractive ... but it is clear that if we
suppose that expressions without semantic value may still
have a sense, we cannot avail ourselves of this conception.
And, if a proper name has no sense, then nothing is expressed by
an utterance that contains it. Hence McDowell's conclusion that no belief
is expressed by the native's utterance 'Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder'.
The form of the argument appears to be this. We begin with the
premise that the best way to go about framing a theory of sense, is to
construct a theory of denotation that may do duty for one. Peformance
of this duty consists in employment of clauses that state what needs to
be stated for the theory of denotation, but that do so in a special way.
The clauses must state what they state in a way that shows the senses
of the expressions they deal with. For McDowell and Evans following
this advice seems to require the incorporation into the theory of
meaning of clauses of the form (1). Then they note that empty proper
names cannot be honestly handled by such clauses. The conclusion is
that these names have no senses: and this is, or leads directly to, the
WCO view.
4.1 Reply to Third Argumnent
The argument takes a false step. The step from the constraints upon
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the clauses of the theory of denotation, to the recommendation of
clauses of form (1), is nowhere justified. It is true that such clauses
provide an admirable way of implementing the general proposal, for the
special case of proper names with referents. But McDowell and Evans
nowhere argue (that I am aware of) that the clauses provide the only
way of following the general program in the particular case. So it will
be possible to short-circuit the argument, if we can find clauses of
some form other than (1), that will do for the theory of sense, but that
can be applied to empty proper names.
Evidently some clause like the following is our best bet:
(4) (x)(N stands for x iff ... x...)
But what is to fill in the blanks?
The question appears to be embarrassing. What fills the blanks must
suffice to specify the referent of the name, if it has one, and at the
same time must display the name's sense. But there is no reason to
suppose that for every name, a description that does both of these
things will be abroad. Appropriate descriptions, it seems, will only be
forthcoming where there is some specific descriptive condition,
associated with the name, and generally held, by those who understand
the name, to fix its reference. (Some empty proper names may have
that property, which is why I said earlier that McDowell and Evans
might admit exceptions to their general thesis). If a name lacks this
property, then, though we might easily enough find a description that
specifies the name's referent, we will have no right to suppose that it
gives the name's sense (c.f. Evans, op. cit. p. 48).
- 68 -
Let us not panic. If the name has a bearer, then an appropriate
description can always be found. We just have to combine the standard
disquotation trick with an '=' sign. So we could employ a clause like:
(5) (x)('Mumbo-Jumbo' stands for x iff x=Mumbo-Jumbo)
If our metalanguage is regimented with a standard logic, then (5) will
not do as it stands. The second occurrence of 'Mumbo-Jumbo' is in a
quantifiable position, and will permit existential generalization.
But there are two manoeuvres available to remedy this, both of which
I find independently advisable.
Intuitively it seems as though (5) is true rather than false or lacking
in truth value. If that is right then the metalanguage that best
captures intuition will be based on a free logic, a logic that does not
permit existential generalization in (5). An appropriate and elegant
regimentation of a metalanguage suitable for formulating a version of (5)
in such a way that it comes out true, has been provided by Burge.15
McDowell, of course, would not countenance the intuition that (5)
should be counted true. But that is not the issue. His claim was that a
theory of meaning that employed axioms for proper names that showed
the names' senses as it stated conditions upon their reference could not
handle empty proper names. But (5), ensconced in the appropriate
language, will serve just as well as (I) for non-empty proper names,
15. Burge, T., 'Truth and Singular Terms', somewhat ironically in
Platts, ed., ibid.
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and is not falsified by empty ones.
The second manoeuvre for getting out of ontological troubte would be
to treat names as predicates. There are two ways of doing this. The
16first would be to take a leaf from Quine's book and collapse the
semantically complex '= Mumbo-Jumbo' into the semantically simple
predicate 'is Mumbo-Jumbo', with 'is' copular.
We would then avail ourselves of the (relatively) ontologically neutral
clause:
(6) (x)('Mumbo-Jumbo' stands for x iff x is Mumbo-Jumbo)
Here the tnquoted occurrence of 'Mumbo-Jumbo' is not a singular
term, and its position is not (first-order) quantifiable. The predicate 'is
Mumbo-Jumbo' would be uniquely true of Mumbo-Jumbo, if he existed,
and otherwise would have empty extension.17
The import of (6) would be that the object-language expression
'Mambo-Jumbo' would function as a descriptive phrase true of just
Mumbo-Jumbo, or of nothing. So 'Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder' would
be elliptical for 'The Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder'.
Employing the Quinean predicates in an account of natural language
proper names is relatively plausible for those names which have a
16. The book is Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object, M. I. T. press,
1960, the leaf is 179.
17. Dummett makes just this response to Evans and McDowell, in
Dummett, M., The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 136.
- 70 -
unique, generally accepted purported referent in the community.
'Mumbo-Jumbo' would probably be an example, along with 'Pegasus' and
some others. It does not seem to work very well for common or garden
names like 'Ike', 'Mike' and 'Spike'. If a theorist of meaning were to tell
us that
(7) (x)('Mike' stands for x iff x is Mike)
we would not learn very much. If there is one main Mumbo-Jumbo, then
(6) does speLify the conditions that deter'mine the value of
'Mumbo-Jumbo*. If there are many Mikes, then (7) does no such thing
for 'Mike': which thing dces x have to be, if it is to be the value of
the word?
4.2 A Modified Burgian Treatment of Proper Names
Most ordinary proper names are best treated as predicates that are
capable of being true of many different individuals, rather than being
true of just a unique individual or nothing. This treatment of namus is
due to Burge.18
Burge notes that names may without impropriety function as common
nouns. One can say, for example, 'If there is one main Mumbo-Jumbo,
then (6) does specify the coi.ditions that determine the value of
"Mumbo-Jumbo"', 'If there are many Mikes, then (7) does no such thing
for "Mike"' and 'An empty "Mandy" has a different meaning from the




name of a Mandy, properly so-called'.
The meaning of proper names is apparent in such sentences. To be a
Mandy is to be someone (perhaps even something) who is properly
called 'Mandy', whose name (or one of whose names) is 'Mandy'. What it
is to be properly called 'Mandy' is a question that lies outside the
theory of meaning proper. The theorist of meaning does not have to
give an account of the conditions under which one is the genuine owner
of a proper name. She is committed ornly to there being such an account
to be given.
Since there genuinely is such a thing as being a Mike, and being a
Mike is necessary and sufficient for 'Mike' to be true of one, we may
enter (8) into our theory of meaning:
(8) (x)(x satisfies 'Mike' iff x is a Mike)
(8), unlike (7), does specify the conditions that determine whether or
not something is a semantic value of 'Mike'. Where (7) left us wondering
which Mike was in question, (8) tells us that any old Mike will do, and
so leaves nothing undetermined.
Burge (ibid p. 432) recommends that when a proper name functions
in a sentence as a singular term, the sentence should be formalized as
an open sentence: 'Aristotle is human' becomes
19. For a creditable theory of how names get hooked up to their
bearers see Evans, G., 'The Causal Theory of Names', Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume vol. XLVII, 1973, and chapter 11 ot
Evans op. cit.
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(9) Is-Human( [xi] Aristotle(x i ))
The free variable may be quantified from without, but, more standarly,
will receive its value from a contextual act of demonstration. In saying
'Aristotle is human' one is referring to a particular Aristotle. So, on
Burge's view, it is as if one said 'That Aristotle is human', indicating
the Aristotle that one has in mind.
I would, however, prefer 'The contextually definite NN is F' to 'That
NN is F' for capturing the flavour of uses of proper names as singular
terms. For uses of names are very rarely accompanied by anything
resembling an act of demonstration on the speaker's part. It is rather
that a speaker will, in using a proper name, succeed in identifying a
particul, individual for his audience, if in the context of utterance
there is a most salient bearer of that name. When the context is thus
propitious the speaker has to do nothing more than utter the name in
order successfully to refer. No demonstration is required. And if the
context is not thus propitious, then the audience will not know to whom
the speaker is trying to refer. (C. f. Evans ibid. p. 374, for some
considerations in a similar but not identical vein).
Burge offers two arguments for his demonstrative-ridder, formulation,
neither of which are satisfactory.
His first argument is that 'Jim is 6 feet tall', like 'that book is green'
are (ibid. p. 432):
incompletely interpreted - they lack truth value. The user
of the sentences must pick out a particular (e. g. a
particular Jim or book) if the sentences are to be judged
- 73 -
true or false. It is this conventional reliance on
extra-sentential action or context to pick out a particular
which signals the demonstrative element in both sentences.
But the behaviour of 'The contextually definite F' does not seem
relevantly different from demonstratives in this respect. If I write 'The
contextually definite dog is hungry' you are no more capable of
assessing the truth value of my claim than if I write 'that book is
green' or 'Jim is 6 feet tall'. If one is attributing to the object language
a bivalent logic, then all three sentences come out false. If one is
attributing to it truth value gaps, then all three will be seen to lack a
truth value.
Burge's second argument is that proper names, like demonstratives,
always seem to take the widest possible scope. But this also seems true
of 'the contextually definite' (compare 'the actual' as an operator that
ensures that a definite description be read rigidly). The modifier
'contextually' singles out the actual context, and so makes the definite
description act similarly to a demonstrative.
So I would recommend that (8) be employed in the proof of
T-sentences that tell us this sort of thing: 'Mike is F' uttered by s at t
is true iff in s's context at t, there is exactly one contextually definite
Mike, and he is F.
Our problem was to find way to construct clauses that allow us to
show the sense of a name that has a bearer, by specifying its referent,
but that also allow us, without undesirable ontological commitment, to
convey the senses of bearerless names.
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We have found three ways of meeting the requirements. We can either
use clauses like (5) with a free logic or use Quinean predicates, as in
(6); either of those two options would be suitable for names that have a
primary purported referent. Or we could follow Burge (with suggested
amendment) and employ clauses like (8), with appropriate supplementary
mechanics for proving the right T-sentences.
The possibility of exploiting these methotds does not suffice to show
that empty proper names do have senses, where this is to mean that
they can be used to express or report genuine thoughts. But the
argument that we were considering is met. That argument depended on
the assumption that only clauses of the form (1) could serve the duplex




5.1 First Case: Perception
For McDowell che countenancing of narrow content as a general
feature of propositional attitudes carries a commitment to 'the idea that
thought relates to objects with an essential indirectness'. There are
various ways in which this indirectness might come up, for example a
description theory of reference for names and demonstratives, or what
resembles a 'sense data' account of perception. As he puts it in DRS
(p. 293), crediting demonstratives with 'senses that determine objects in
such a way that that the senses are expressible whether the objects
exist or not' ... generates a falsification of demonstrative thought
akin to the falsification of perceptual experience that is
induced by representative realism. Representative realism
postulates items that are "before the mind" in experience
whether objects are perceived or not, with the effect that
when an object is perceived, it is conceived as "present to
the mind" only by proxy.
And Evans (op. cit. p. 199) suggests that resistance to a WCO (he
calls it 'Russellian') theory of demonstrative thoughts might arise from a
picture of mind that
is already rejected when one acknowledges that if in
perception anything is before the mind, it is the public
objects themselves, not some internal representation of
them. The thesis we have been considering [=the WCO
thesis] is really no more than a corollary of this realism.
McDowell and Evans are claiming that the supporter of narrow content
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is committed, willy nilly, to a faulty picture of reference, knowledge,
and perception. This picture suffers the defects of the old 'sense data'
theory of perception, and has, as its least endearing feature, a
Berkeleyan idealism, or solipsistic skepticism, as a consequence.
How does the argument go? Realism (not "representative realism", a
view that McDowell thinks cannot but collapse into skepticism) depends
upon holding that when one perceives an object, what is 'before the
mind' (as Evans puts it) really is the object. Suppose it were not so,
but that what was before the mind was some mental representative of
the object. Then we should have to deduce the existence and nature of
an external object, from the representative itself. But no such
deduction could be sound, since the representative could exist, exactly
as it is, in the absence of any such object. And it becomes a mystery
how we can even form a conception of any occupant of a reality that
lies thus for ever beyond our ken.
What goes for perception goes for cognition generally. So, the fear
is, the consequences of an NCA view are dire. If a sense or concept
always comes between us and the external objects of our thoughts, and
from these senses or concepts there is no sound deduction of the
existence of the external objects, how can we ever know the object is
there, or even understand what it would be for an object to be there?
We will be, as Dummett puts it 'inescapably locked into a third realm
inhabited by thoughts and their components ... unable to reach the
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outer world of actual physical things'. 2 0
5.2 Reply to First Case
I am disturbed by the threatened conclusion. However, I cannot find
anything that is essential to the NCA view, that leads into the mire. So
I shall try to state the minimal requirements of the view, and argue
against Evans and McDowell that the paths I need tread are hardly more
perilous than those open only to the WCO theorist.
Embracal of narrow content involves no more than the claim that to
think (have an experience) of x involves having in one's mind some
distinct thing, y, that both refers to (is of) x, and that has genuine
content of a sort that is independent of x. Such a claim is indeed a
common component of the dangerous views that Evans and McDowell,
quite rightly, turn their backs on. But to say just that would provide
the materials for only the most pitiful of inductive arguments. And that
is not what McDowell and Evans intend.
Certainly there are ways of interpreting the relations that hold among
the various elements included in the NCA picture, that will invite
trouble. In particular if we thought of the narrow content of a concept
as the object of the concept, then we would have to explain how we
could perceive, or even conceive of, something lying beyond the narrow
content, out there in the real world. Evans and McDowell frequently
20. Dummett, ibid. As I implied, Dummett does not accept the
McDowellU/Evans argument.
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saddle the NCA view with this error. The misconstrual of the NCA
position is apparent in the quotations provided above, and quite explicit
in other places. McDowell for example (CDK) considers an argument
that begins with the premise that a subject may not be able to tell
whether his experience is deceptive or not, and proceeds towards the
conclusion that experience provides 'at best a defeasible ground' for
knowledge. We shall be looking at a similar argument shortly, but now I
want to draw attention to how McDowell elaborates on it.
He reformulates the argument:
In a deceptive case, what is embraced within the scope of
experience is an appearance that such and such is the case
falling short of the fact; a mere appearance. So what is
experienced in a non-deceptive case is a mere appearance
too.
Then, in the next paragraph hle refers back to a part of the
argument with the words 'As before the object of the experience in the
deceptive case is a mere appearance.' And he goes on, understandably,
to claim that in the non-deceptive case the object of experience is not a
mere appearance, but some part of the real outside world.
Surely enough some famous works have contained an argument that
began with the premise that one sometimes cannot distinguish deceptive
experiences from non-deceptive ones, and ended up with the conclusion
that what is experienced, the object of experience, is the same in the
two cases. The next natural stopping place is some sort of idealism or
scepticism. But that is an importantly different argument from the one
that McDowell appeared to start out with, and ought to have been
considering .
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The latter argument moves simply from the stated premise to the
conclusion that the experiences, considered in and of themselves, are
the same in the two cases. Such a claim does not entail that the objects
of experience are the same. And the sensible move at this stage is
simply to deny that they are. In the sense in which what I experience,
the object of my experience, is, in the non-deceptive case, some real
thing in the world, there is nothing that is experienced, no object of
experience, in the deceptive case. Yet the experiences themselves may
be the same in their non-relational characteristics; and that is all that
is required by the NCA theorist.
Availing myself of this essential distinction between the non-relational
character of an experience, and the object of which it is an experience,
clears me of the crude version of McDowell's and Evans' objection. But
underlying the crude form is a more subtle and interesting line of
thought, that proceeds without the needless slide.
To keep my feet on firm ground, I must show that cognitive relations
to the physical world can constitute kr.owledge, even if they consist in
having in one's mind something that could exist, even if the rest of the
world did not. So the following sort of story must be intelligible. I
know that there is a keyboard in front of me, because I see it there.
My seeing it involves my having a visual presentation that could be just
as it is even in the absence of the keyboard (I could be hallucinating).
Yet, nevertheless, I see the keyboard and I know that it is there.
To McDowell stories like the little one told by my last three sentences
seem highly problematic. Objecting to a 'criterial' view, he writes
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(ibid.) that it
envisage [ s ascribing knowledge on the strength of
something compatible with the falsity of what is supposedly
known. And it is a serious question whether we can
understand how it can be knowledge that is properly so
ascribed.
The question is serious for the following reason. If I admit that the
basis for my claim to knowledge that p is the experience, and I also
claim that my experience is compatible with not-p, then I appear to be
committed to a pair of claims that sit uncomfortably on the samt knee.
My experience legitimates my claim to know that p. But, my experience
being what it is, I must also concede that for all I know, not-p. The
discomfort may be heightened by the observation that if for all I know,
not-p, then it follows that none among my items of knowledge rules out
not-p. And that entails, by elementary logic, that the knowledge that p
is not one of those items.
I require it to be possible for an experience to be both legitimate
ground for a claim to knowledge that p, anr4 such that it is compatible
with the failure of p to obtain. I must therefore deny that the
compatibility of the experience with not-p forces the concession that for
all I know, not-p. And this seems right independently. For that denial
is tantamount to the quite harmless assertion that one may be in a
position to claim to know that p on the basis of evidence from which p
does not follow logically.
McDowell (ibid.) does not see how it is possible to 'drive a wedge
between accepting that everything that one has is compatible with
things not being so, on the one hand, and admitting that one does not
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know that things are so, on the other.' In particular, he holds, no
appeal to conventions governing the use of the word 'know' can help us
out here, since we would have to show that the conventions were
'well-founded'. But, McDowell says, tht 'criterial' view and its fellows
(among which, on this particular matter if few others, the NCA view is
to be counted) concedes 'that the sceptic's complaints are substantially
correct'. And that concession, he says, cannot leave room for any
appeal to the well-foundedness of the conventions.
It is perhaps unsurprising that each side thinks that it is the other
who concedes too much to the sceptic. All that I am conceding to the
sceptic is that the experiences that are available to justify my claim to
know that p may be expected to be compatible with not-p. I cannot see
how this undermines the well-foundedness of the "conventions"
governing the use of the word 'know'. Or, to make a stronger claim in
the same vein: given what the word 'know' means, and hence, what
knowledge is, the sceptic is right at least in saying that what grounds
our claims to knowledge does not always establish it beyond all possible
doubt. It is just a fact about knowledge, that one's posession of it may
be based upon something that does not logically entail the truth of what
is known. The contrary supposition must stem from a need to believe
that what distinguishes a subject who knows that p, from one who does
not, must lie in the characteristics of the subjects' experiences,
considered in and of themselves, rather than in, say, some external
thing to which the experience may be suitably related. But it is exactly
that which the sceptic holds, and that we have no need to concede.
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Consider two subjects whose experiences are the same, in both cases
warranting a claim to knowledge. Suppose that in one case the
experience reveals the truth, and in the other, it misleads. In one case
the subject really does know what he claims to know, in the other, the
claim is in fact false, but still justified, in the sense of being
adequately grounded, so that the subject was quite right to make it.
McDowell (ibid.) goes so far as ask.
How can a difference in respect of something considered as
cognitively inaccessible to both subjects ... make it the
case that one of them knows how things are in that
inaccessible region while the other does not -- rather than
leaving them uoth, strictly speaking, ignorant of the
matter?
It is a fear that this sceptical question has no answer, that leads
McDowell to hold that the experiences of the two subjects cannot,
considered by themselves, be the same. I shall argue later that the
question is one that McDowell also must face, in which case its
fearsomeness or otherwise counts neither way. But I think the fear is
groundless. If we take a closer look at the question we can see that it
lacks potency.
The 'difference in respect of something cognitively inaccessible to
both subjects' is simply a difference that does not effect the intrinsic
nature of the subjects' experiences, considered in abstraction from the
outside world. McDowell's formulation in terms of 'cognitively
inaccessible' regions quite unnecessarily invites the sceptic's challenges.
For if we take cognition to include knowledge, as we should, then of
course even the proponent of narrow content can hold that the
difference in the surroundings of the two subjects is 'cognitively
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accessible'. No skeptical conclusions will then follow.
If we adopt a restrictive use of 'cognition', then the region in which
hides the distinguishing feature of the two cases, is indeed cognitively
inaccessible. But then we have no difficulty in answering McDowell's
question. The difference in the 'cognitively inaccessible' region is the
difference between the obtaining of what the subjects claim to know,
and its not obtaining. The very boring fact that 'S knows that p'
entails that p, thus ensiu:es that one subject may know that p, while
the other does not.
The proper way to respond to the sceptic is not to search for some
feature of our experiences that guarantees their accuracy, but to make
it plausible that even if "everything that one has is compatible with
things not being so, on the one hand, one may yet know that things
are so, on the other". I do not think that the task would be very
hard. Let me offer the briefest of caricatures of how the tale would
unfold.
'Everything that one has' means everything that one may legitimately
draw upon in ascertaining how things are. To say that everything that
one has is compatible with, say, its not raining is just to say that it is
logically possible that everything that one has could be just as it is,
and it not be raining. Suppose thae everything that you have includes
the visual, auditory, olfactory and tactile sensations typically associated
with being out in the rain. Everything else is, as fa as you can tell,
just as it should be; there is no evidence that your senses are out of
order, that you are being tricked, or that anything is disturbing the
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status quo. You have, in short, overwhelming evidence that it is
raining. But that is all you have.
If you have overwhelming evidence that it is raining, and this
evidence is caused, in the usual manner, by its actually raining, then
you know that it is raining. What more could possibly be required to
legitimate your claim to knowledge? But still, the conditions that
legitimate the claim to knowledge do not logically guarantee that it is
raining. To suppose that what grounds a legitimate claim to knowledge
must logically guarantee that what is claimed to oe known actually
obtains, is simply to confuse knowledge with a kind of certainty that is
a philosopher's invention. One might expect a sceptic to make this
confusion, but it is hardly prudent for the rest of us.
The pr sition that McDowell attempts to adopt is supposed to leave
adequate room for the required distinction between knowledge and
certainty. It seems to me, however, that the manoeuvres required to
make this room, lead McDowell into exactly the admissions he strives to
avoid.
On his articulation of the WCO position the difference between our
two subjects whcse epistemi, states differed only in what went on
outside of their heads, must be written into their experiential states.
For one subject, his experience would be held not to 'fall short of the
facts': rather, his experience would just be the fact itself 'made
perceptually manifest' to him. For tae other, what is experienced would
be 'mere appearance'. This poses a risk , our fallibility. If the
experience of its raining were truly different when it was raining, from
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when it was not raining, how could we fail to distinguish the two? And
if we could alwals distinguish the two, how could we be fooled by the
deceptive experiences?
McDowell's answer is obvious enough. The content of a subject's
experience is not fully accessible to introspection: at least, one is not
always in a positien to tell which sort of experience one is having. One
may not be able tell whether one's experience is the fact that it is
raining, within one's cognitive reach, or a mere appearance that this is
so. Thus he concedes that 'there may be deceptive cases experientially
indistinguishable from non-deceptive cases' (ibid.). This
indistinguishability of cL urse cannot reside in the experiences
themselves, but only in the fact that a subject may not know which of
the two he is enjoying. So it is not conceded that in the two cases
there exist two experiences, which experiences are identical. It is only
conceded that the mere appearance of its raining may seem the same
(not be the same) as the reality of its raining, when that is
experienced.
But even this meager concession is fatal. McDowell concedes that the
subject cannot tell whether he has an accurate experience or a
deceptive one. But if a subject cannot tell the difference between the
two experiences, then that difference is not something he may exploit in
ascertaining which of the two he has. So the difference that McDowell
has written into the subjects' experiences cannot be epistemically
"elevant.
McDowell (ibid.) attempts to answer this criticism.
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One could hardly countenance the idea of having a fact
made manifest within the reach of one's experience, without
supposing that that wodld make knowledge of the fact
available to one.
The root idea [behind the criticism) is that one's epistemic
standing on some question cannot intelligibly be constituted,
even in part, by matters blankly external to how it is with
one subjectively. For how could such matters be other than
beyond one's ken?
When someone has a fact made manifest to him, the
obtaining of the fact contributes to his epistemic standing
on the question. But the obtaining of the fact is precisely
not blankly external to his subjectivity
The criticism is not answered by a restatement of the contested
conclusion (the first and penultimate sentences in the quoted sections),
and a reformulation ot the objector's point in a vocabulary that obscures
it (the second paragraph). Like 'cognitively inaccessible', 'blankly
external to how it is with one subjectively' is a slippery phrase.
McDowell carl certainly respond to its use by saying that if an
experience is a fact within one's cognitive reach, then the fact is not
blankly external to how it is with one subjectively. But the objection
proceeds simply from the concession that a subject cannot distinguish
between the two experiences. It does not matter whether the difference
between the experiences is counted as being part of how it is with the
subject subjectively, or not. If he cannot distinguish between the swo
things, then that distinction is not something that he has to go on
when it comes to deciding how it is in the world around him.
The place at which we end up, then, after winding our way through
McDowel]'s view and its consequences, is exactly the one where the NCA
theorist is already at rest. We are left with the task of explaining how
it can be that when "everything that one has is compatible with things
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not being so, on the one band, one may yet know that things are so,
on the other". And that of course, is just facing the question about
how the contents of a 'cognitively inaccessible' region can make the
difference between knowledge and lack of it.
6 Second Case: Reference
The argument goes a little differently in the case of reference.
McDowell (SRPN) says that opposition to his view involves a 'suspect
conception of how thought relates to reality', a conception which 'would
have to seek its support in the idea that' reference is mediated 'by way
of a blueprint or specification, which, if formulated, would be
expressed in purely general terms.' McDowell and Evans see this
conception as one that, like the faulty theory of perception and
knowledge we discussed, must keep the mind locked up within itself,
unable, in the end, to conceive of anything outside.
Perhaps that last claim is correct. How would reference be accounted
for on the suspect conception of how thought relates to reality?
Concepts would have to contain fully individuative descriptive elements
to take up the burden of reference. The concept would then refer to
whatever object uniquely satisfied the description. The likely difficulty
would be to find descriptive elements that could do the trick. These
elements themselves would have to be free of any indexical or
object-involving components, or the original conception of how thought
relates to reality would be forfeit. And then, surely enough, the theory
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would never allow the mind to break outside of itself. The argument
would take some spelling out, but it looks fair.
6.1 Reply to Second Case
However, none of this need concern the proponent of narrow content.
It is no part of the general NCA view that the narrow content of a
concept is a 'blueprint or specification which, if formulated, would be
expressed in purely general terms.'21 The NCA position requires only
that the narrow content of a concept be that in the subject which allows
him to refer to the object, and that it be recognizably content. It does
not have to take up the full burden of reference on either of these
counts. The first constraint requires only that narrow content be
suitable to take up part of the burden of reference. The rest may be
supplied by external relations between subject and object. The second
constraint requires that referring concepts have some sort of mental
content that is reference-independent, but does not require that thi1
content be semantic content expressible in form of an individuative
description. Evans and McDowell do not accept this last; and here, I
think, we find one of the deepest points of disagreement between the
NCA and the WCO theorists.
21. This is not violated by any of the treatments of names that I
recommended for the theory of meaning. True enough, 'is Mumbo-Jumbo'
may be used in a specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for
being the referent of 'Mumbo-Jumbo', and it shows the name's sense.
But nothing is implied about what it is that determines what the name
refers to.
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Both Evans and McDowell take it as an essential part of the NCA
view, that on it narrow contents must by themselves fully individuat,
their extensions. Thus Evans (ibid. p. 202) wiites 'The methodological
solipsist [=NCA theorist] wants M-thinking [=narrow content) to be
recognizably thinking - which requires at least that it be a
representational state.' And 'It is of the essence of a representational
state that it be capable of assessment as true or false'. It does follow
from this thesis that the narrow content of a referring concept would
have to be fully individuative of its referent. The reason for this is as
follows.
A thought of the form a is F where a is a referring component, will
be true iff the referent of a satisfies F. Now suppose that the thought
is assessable as true or false purely in virtue of its narrow content.
Then the narrow content of a must determine which thing would have to
satisfy F, for the thought to be true. But, since narrow content is
reference-independent, it could only do this by description.
But it is not, Evans and McDowell notwithstanding, any part of the
NCA view that the narrow content of a thought must be capable of
assessment as true or false. The condition that I placed upon narrow
content, and that corresponds to Evans' condition that it be
recognizably thinking, was only that it be recognizably mental, and
deserving of the second part of its name. Narrow content can have that
status without its being the case that the narrow content of any




Evans moves too quickly from the requirement that narrow content be
recognizably thinking to the requirement that it be assessable, taken by
itself, for truth value. Why shouldn't thinking just be what goes on in
the subject when he undergoes states which, when hooked up
appropriately to a surrounding context, become evaluable for truth?
There is nothing in the notion of a though (the lay, not the F'regean
notion, of course) that dictates that its pi ssession of truth conditions,
or truth value, is intrinsic to it, rather than something it has only
given a context. 2 2
6.2 Points of View
Thought considered purely as the possessor of narrow content may
be content, and recognizably so. Consider, if you will, a Twin Earth
example involving McDowell's native. One case is as McDowell originally
specified, with no Mumbo-Jumbo and a deluded native. In the other
case there is a Mumbo-Jumbo, godlike in nature, and the native's
concept Mumbo-Jumbo reft rs to him. But the native's individualistic
properties, properties the existence and nature of which depend only
upon the subject himself, viewed in abstraction from any particular
surrounding context, are the same in the two cases.
Whether or not the native's thoughts differ in truth conditions across
22. 1 think that any suggestion that the issue is becoming merely
terminological, would be misguided. Questions about what should be
called 'thinking' or 'content' are better seen as questions about what
thinkillg and content are. There is a genuine issue here, and an
important one.
- 91 -
the two cases, the way the world appears to him will be the same. If
we were to transplant the native from one context to the other, he
would not notice. The two cases are therefore the same from the
subject's point of view.23 Whatever differences there are between the
two cases, are ones that do not affect the way the world appears to the
native. If the subject's point of view fails to determine the extension of
his concepts and the truth conditions of his thoughts, then this shows
that there is a level of content that is not truth-conditional, a kind of
thought that is not, taken by itself, assessable for truth value. It does
not show that the subject's subjective point of viewy has no content.
When we want to understand, from a sympathetic human point of
view, what motivates someone, what guides his thoughts and actions,
precisely what we try to find out is how things are from that person's
point of view. Suppose, for example, that you are interested in
understanding some aspect of Freud's thought that involved his concept
of the Unconscious. I am imagining trying to understand Freud, the
man, and his picture of the world, not trying to learn about the world
by studying Freud. Suppose that to begin with you have little
conception of what the Unconscious is supposed to be. You learn an
expression 'the Unconscious', with which you associate a concept that is
little more than a place-holder in your thought.
To understand Freud's concept better you must try to develop a
23. A point of contact here with Blackburn's (Blackburn op. cit.)
defence of narrow content.
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Freudian picture oft the world. You must try to see the world through
Freud's eyes. You ask yourself 'How would Freud say the Unconscious
was manifest in this series of actions?', 'How did Freud think that
unconscious thoughts might become conscious?' and so on. The whole
enterprise would be spoiled if in constructing the picture you paid
attention to whether or not the Unconscious existed, or to whether
anything else in it was part of the objective world, rather than a
figment of Freud's imagination. If Freud believed in something that you
do not believe in, you still include the thing in your conception of the
world according to Freud. If Freud did not believe in something that
you do believe in, you do not include the thing in your picture. 24
Analogously if you want to understand how things are from the
native's point of view, why he thinks what he thinks, and does what he
does, you must pay no attention to whether or not Mumbo-Jumbo exists.
Your sympathetic understanding of the workings of the native's mind
will suffer if differences between the two cases are built into your
pictures of the world according to the native. If your models of how
things appear from the native's point of view make it seem as though
things appear differently to him across the two cases, you have made a
mistake.
If that much of the contents of the native's mind as appears in your
24. Here there is some harmony with Dennett, D., 'Beyond Belief', in
Woodfield, A., ed., Thought and Object, Oxford University press,
1982, though we have different ideas about which world best represents
the subject's point of view.
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model is insufficient, taken by itself, to be assessed tor truth value,
this shows that to be recognizably thinking requires less than Evans
supposed. For the understanding that is given to you by the picture is
an understanding of the native's conception of the world. A conception
of the world, thus solipsistically viewed, is recognizably thinking.
Indeed thought is more easily recognized in this way than, in any other;
for one recognizes the thoughts from the inside, from the perspective
of the thinker.
Understanding another's point of view, in this sympathetic,
everyday, sort of way, involves adopting that point of view in the first
person. One does not have to believe, or even try to believe, or feign
to believe, that the world is as it appears from that point of view. One
merely has to imagine how the world would appear to someone whose
point of view it was.
To be sure, what one envisages while trying to grasp how things
appear from another's point of view, is a world of extra-mental,
extra-cranial things. But this does not render the content that one
strives to understand wide rather than narrow. The content is
understood in terms of how the world appears when conceived through
it, not upon what there is, by of a world, to be conceived of.
I, in my world, can understand how the world appears to the
residents of Putnam's Twin Earth, by thinking of water. On Twin Earth
there is no water, and the extension of their concept is some other
substance, XYZ. When I think of water, in order to understand the
thoughts of a Twin Earthperson, I do not need to attribute to that
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person a concept that has the same extension as the one I am employing
myself. The other's concept need not have any extension at all. I take
note only of how my concept presents its actual extension, not of what
is thereby presented. The content of the concept that I thereby come
to grasp is therefore narrow; it remains the same whatever its
extension. The actual extension of my concept is, one might say, a
ladder to the narrow content (one must, so to speak, throw it away
after one has climbed up on it).
McDowell (SRPN) says this:
In practice an interpreter might say things like 'This man is
saying that Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder', and might
explain an utterance which he described in this way as
expressing the belief that Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder.
That is no real objection. Such an interpreter is simply
playing along with his deluded subject - putting things his
way.
Understanding how things are from another's point of view requires
playing along with her, putting things her way. I see no reason to
think that the kind of understanding of a subject that we derive by
putting things her way, is inferior or defective in any way. Nor do I
see any reason to think that what is thereby made accessible to us is
something less than the contents of a person's minrd.
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PAPER THREE
SEEING WHAT IS NOT THERE
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The Eye altering alters all
- William Blake




Tyler Burge sets out to show that the computational theory of
vision2 is not individualistic. He tells us that
According to individualism about the mind, the mental
natures of all of a person's or animal's mental states (and
events) are such that there is no necessary or deep
individuative relation between the individual's being in
states of those kinds and the nature of the individual's
physical or social environments. (Burge, pps. 3-4).
When Burge claims that Marr's theory is not individualistic, what he
means is that there is some necessary or deep individuative relation
between some of the representational contents3 attributed by the theory
1. Burge, T., 'Individualism and Psychology', The Philosophical Review,
Jan. 1986.
2. 1 shall follow Burge in referring to it as Marr's theory. As Burge
notes, very substantial contributions have been made to the
computational theory by various others. The most complete and
accessible account of the theory is to be found in Marr's book, Vision,
San Fransisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982. All references to Marr
are from the book, unless otherwise specified.
3. By 'representational content' I intend something that is individuated
by its semantic, or intentional properties. Two identical syntactic
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to the visual system, and aspects of the extra-cranial environment.
The point of the qualifier 'necessary or deep' is to make it clear that
the kind of individuation in question is grournded in essential properties
of what is individuated. The essentialism need not be Aristotelian; it is
just that if any state or event lacked the individuating properties, it
would, ipso facto, be debarred from belonging to the individuated kind.
Burge's claim is that, on Marr's theory, representational contents are
individuated by reference to certain features of the world outside the
subject, in such a way that the contents could not exist in
environments that lacked those features. Consequently the
representational contents a subject is capable of having are not
determined solely by what we might call her individualistic properties,
properties that depend only upon how things are within her physical
boundaries, solipsistically regarded. According to Burge, Marr's theory
entails that two subjects whose physical states were type identical,
down to the last quark, could have representations with different
contents, if they inhabited suitably different physical surroundings.
I think that Burge is mistaken. Marr's theory, at least on a
straightforward and reasonable interpretation, is perfectly
individualistic.
tokens may instantiate (or have, if you prefer) different
representational contents. A representation is a syntactic object, though
typically it will have semantic properties.
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1.2 Preview
In the next section I shall explain relevant aspects of Marr's theory,
as I understand it, pausing to note points that will be important to the
subsequent argument. In section 3 1 shall recount Burge's argument
that Marr's theory is not individualistic, and explain more precisely
what is at issue. The issue will turn out to depend upon the
description we should expect from Marr's theory, of a certain type of
counterfactual conditional. Each conditional concerns, as is not
surprising, which rep resentational contents a subject would have
enjoyed, had she graced a suitably different environment. Burge argues
that according to Marr's theory, her representational contents would
vary across environments, and that therefore the theory is not
individualistic. In sections 4, 5 and 6 I shall dispute this, giving my
own account of the proper reaction to the counterfactuals. The final
section will be concerned with exegesis. Burge cites some passages from
Marr that he (Burge) takes to support his position. I shall show that
the passages cohere perfectly with my own understanding of Marr's
theory.
2 Marr's Theory
Marr (p. 99) formulates his task thus:
Our overall goal is to understand vision completely, that is,
to understand how descriptions of the world may efficiently
and reliably be obtained from [retinal] images of it. The
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human system is a working example of a machine that can
make such descriptions ... one of our aims is to
understand it thoroughly, at all levels: What kind of
information does the human visual system represent, what
kind of computations does it perform to obtain this
information, and why? How does it represent this
information and how are the computations performed and
with what algorithms? ... How are these specific
representations implemented in neural machinery?
As Burge notes, the enterprise has three separate parts (see Marr
p. 24-27).4 i) The computational theory (Marr p. 24) 'in which the
performance of the device is characterized as a mapping from one kind
of information to another, the abstract properties of this mapping are
defined precisely, and its appropriateness and adequacy for the task at
hand are demonstrated.' ii) The theory of representation and algorithm: .
the information must be represented in some representational system,
with specific primitives that make explicit specific information, and the
computations must be performed by some particular algorithms. The
second part of the theory describes the representations and algorithms.
iii) The theory of hardware implementation: this describes how the
system is physically realized. In what follows we shall be concerned
with the representational aspects of the theory.
The computational theory of vision is a theory that treats the human
visual system as a machine that constructs descriptions of the world in
terms of three dimensional objects, from retinal images. [he retinas are
given computational descriptions, called 'gray arrays', that represent
light intensity values in a two-dimensional coordinate system. Ihe
4. For a more sustained treatment see 'Artificial Intelligence: a Personal
View' in Haugeland, J., ed. Mind Design, Cambridge, M. 1. T. Press,
1981.
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computational problem is: given gray arrays as input, how does the
system produce the complex descriptions of 3D objects as output?
The process breaks up into three stages (see Marr p. 37, p. 330).
The first has two parts. Initially the system must construct a
description of the patterns of light and shade on the retinas; (Marr p.
42) 'representations are obtained of the changes and structures in the
image'. These representations make explicit certain features that will be
useful for the construction of higher representations. Next, certain
computations are performed to construct a first sketch of the surface
outside the viewer, that represents reflectance changes on it. This is
called the 'primal sketch' (for a qualification of this view of the primal
sketch, see section 7, below). At the second stage, on the basis of the
primal sketch, the system constructs a 2.5D sketch of the viewed
surface, explicitly representing information about contour, and rough
depth, in a viewer-centered coordinate frame. Finally the system
constructs from the 2.5D sketch a 31) model representation, that
describes shapes and their orientations relative to an object-centered
coordinate frame.
The passage from each stage to the next is regarded as the making
of an inference: Marr writes (p. 68) 'the true heart of visual perception
is the inference from the structure of an image about the structure of
the real world outside.' At each stage what is inferred from the
information explicit in the representations that are operated upon goes
beyond anything available from that information alone. There is thus a
poverty of stimulus typical of problems in cognitive science. T[he
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5
theorist needs to discover what a priori assumptions are brought to
bear by the system, that allow it to make the inferences. (Marr p. 219,
c. f. Burge p. 33)
The question to ask is, What assumptions are reasonable to
make - that we unconsciously employ - when we interpret
silhouettes ... as three-dimensional shapes?
If the visual system failed to make such assumptions, it would not be
able to infer the nature of the distal causes of its surface irritations
from those irritations. Since the visual system provides accurate
representations under normal conditions, the actual structure of the
world is, in practice, very important to the discovery of the
assumptions built into the system.
The guiding princio;le is that when the representations constructed
are correct under a given set of conditions, this is evidence that the
inferences that yield them are based upon assumptions that are true in
6
such conditions. The kind of assumptions involved are that, for
example, (Marr p. 44) 'the visible world can be regarded as being
composed of smooth surfaces having reflectance functions whose spatial
structure may be elaborate', (Marr p. 51) 'if direction of motion is ever
5. 'A priori' is Marr's expression. The a priori assumptions are not
necessarily true. The point is that they are innate, not learned.
6. The assumptions are not expected to be explicitly represented in the
system. So it may be that the mere fact that a system succeeds under
certain conditions is sufficient to vindicate the attribution of
assumptions that are true in those conditions. Difficult philosophical
questions arise here, into which I shall not enter, and for a discussion
of which see Pylyshyn, Z., Computation And Cognition: Toward A
Foundation For Cognitive Science, Cambridge, M. I. T. Press, 1984,
chapter 5.
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discontinuous at more than one point - along a line, for example, -
then an object boundary is present'. When the assumed conditions hold,
inferences made from the gray arrays come out correct - at least,
within reasonable idealizations. When the assumed constraints do not
hold, illusions tend to result.
I now turn to three points that will be important to our argument.
2.1 First Point
The theory describes how the visual system infers, from the
structure of the gray arrays, representations of three dimensional.
objects in objective space. The nature of the lower descriptions is
determined primarily by the exigencies of solving the overall
computational problem. That is to say, they must a) be recoverable
from the level below, and b) be used in the level above.
Marr (p. 36) explains:
we arrived at the idea of a sequence of representations,
starting with descriptions that could be obtained straight
from an image but that are carefully designed to facilitate
the subsequent recovery of gradually more objective,
physical properties about an object's shape.
The process of constructing representations is regarded as
inferential, and the theory of vision is the theory of the inferences.
Each inference requires an input (from the level below), probably
additional assumptions (innate), and an algorithm to compute an output
representation. Each of these must be described precisely, and it must
be shown that the algorithm works, that the required representations
- 103 -
are actually computable in the manner described: (Marr p. 75) 'we have
to arnalyze exactly what will work, and prove it'. The first point I
emphasise, then, is that if a representation is attributed to the system,
it must be shown exactly how the representation is arrived at, by a
sequence of inferences, from the gray arrays. Representations require
a botton-up account.
2.2 Second Point
Since representations require a bottom-up account, they do not come
8
cheap. The more specific the informational content, the more
computational activity required to derive it from the gray arrays. Given
this constraint one needs a solid motivation for positing a
representation. Such motivation is provided by some need that the
representation will satisfy, some purpose to which it must be put. In
the case of lower representations the purpose will be provided by what
is required of the computations at the next level:
The critical question is, What spatial relations are important
to make explicit now, and why? The answer to this, of
course, depends on the purpose for which the
representation is to be used. For us, the purpose is to
infer the geometry of the underlying surfaces (Marr p.
80).
7. A small qualification: the gray arrays themselves are representations
of light intensity values on the retinas, but we are not offered an
account of how these representations are constructed. lUltimately, I
suppose, that account should be forthcoming.
8. More specific in the sense of being compatible with a narrower range
of distal causes: the informatic that there is a crack on the viewed
surface is more specific than the information that a dark line appears
on it that could be either a crack or something else.
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The information that is made explicit at each stage is carefully chosen
to suit subsequent computations.
The story is much the same for the highest representations Lhat
Marr's theory derives, the 3D model representations. Here again:
Stated baldly, the strong constraints come from what the
representation is to be used for. (P. 326).
The representations, according to Marr, are used for the recognition
of shapes. Such a purpose requires that the representation:
(1) use an object-centered coordinate system, (2) include
volumetric primitives of various sizes, and (3) have a
modular organization. A representation based on a shape's
natural axes (for example, the axes identified by a stick
figure) follows directly from these choices.
What is represented at a given stage is tightly constrained by what
is exploited at the next stage. All the information explicit in the
representions resulting from the early processes is (Marr p. 268)
'announced' in the 2.5D sketch. What appears in the 2.5D sketch is
used to account for our ability to discern surface features, and as
input to the algorithm that computes the 3D model representation. The
elements of the 3D model representation itself are carefully motivated by
what is required for object recognition. In general representations
9require a top-down motivation.
9. This must not be taken to mean that the theory ascribes top-down
visual processing. Marr (p. 100) insists that, on the whole, it does
not. Processing is bottom-up, motivations are top-down.
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2.3 Third Point
The theoretical role of a representation is given by its place in the
sequences of inferences that begin with the gray arrays, and culminate
eventually in hypotheses about the shapes that give rise to them. But
it must, of course, also be shown that the visual system actually
employs the particular representations attributed to it, in the particular
processes attributed to it. A variety of sorts of empirical evidence are
available to constrain the attributions of representations and provide
clues that allow for their discovery. The main source of evidence is
introspective: we know a great deal about what is revealed to us in
perception. The experimental context in which this sort of evidence is
mostly tapped concerns illusions.
So, for example, Chapter 3, section 3 of Marr's book, which is 48
pages long, and explains how we compute stereoscopic information from
the flat gray arrays, contains no less than 15 random dot stereograms.
These are pairs of square dot-patterns; the two squares in each
stereogram are the same except for a region in their centers, which is
displaced slightly in one square relative to the other. If one views them
stereoscopically (exactly one square visible to each eye) (Marr p. 102)
'one vividly and unmistakably perceives a square floating in space above
the background.' By varying the density of the dots, and the amount
of displacement, one uncovers a great deal of information about exactly
w'hat is required for the computation of depth.
Evidence is fairly abundant at lower levels, but tends to peter out at
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the level of the 3D model representation. There are a couple of global
considerations (Marr p. 326):
First, in order to manipulate objects and avoid bumping into
them, organisms must be able to perceive and represent the
disposition of the objects' surfaces in space. This gives a
minimal requirement of something like the 2.5D sketch.
Second, in order to recognize an object by its shape,
allowing one then to evaluate its significance for action,
some kind of three-dimensional representation must be built
from the image and matched in some way to a stored
three-dimensional representation with which other knowledge
is already associated.
And three additional pieces of evidence are cited. The first is that
stick figures (p. 327) 'are usually recognized easily despite the limited
amount of shape information they portray.' This suggests that the type
of information present in stick figures is important in human vision.
The second comes from certain illusions that have to do with the way
we perceive elements in a pattern. Whether or not a given shape at a
given orientation is seen as a square or as a diamond may depend upon
axes that we assignr to a larger pattern in which it apoears. The third
comes from deficits. Certain brain lesions result in losses of
recognitional capacities that seem to require recovery of a shape's
canonical coordinate system (i. e. its stick figure).
All these forms of empirical evidence that particular representations
and algorithms are being used are collected from behavioural data. The
broader considerations concern general requirements upon the sorts of
actions that we visual perceivers are actually capable of;
circumnavigation and manipulation of objects, and the like. Narrower
and more specific data is collected from discrimination experiments:
subjects are asked whether or not they perceive a stereogram as a
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single raised square, whether they can identify a three-dimensional
shape (a bucket, for example) from unusual two-dimensional
representations of it or whether they see something as a square or as a
diamond. Although these tests typically involve verbal behaviour, this
is incidental. A dog could be trained to salivate when it saw a raised
square or a bucket.
What is really being tested for is a mere discriminative capacit;.
Intentional contents are inferred from discriminative behaviour. Such
behaviour by itself does not, to be sure, tell you what the contents
are. But it is assumed that a subject cannot discriminate between two
distal stimuli unless they cause representations with different contents;
so the discrimination tests reveal at least when different contents arise
from different arrays.10 And much of the computational theory can get
by without the theorist knowing more than which differences in
stimulations yield different contents. If a subject can discriminate
between two stimuli, then there must be some features of the gray
arrays and some innate assumptions, that allow her to do so, and the
theorist must search for an account of what these are. The distinction
between the two contents will then be exploited in subsequent
computations. So, for example, the fact that a highlight causes a
10. The claim that different contents, rather than merely different
representations, are necessary for a discriminatory capacity is, of
course, controversial. But I think the claim is mandatory for anyone
who thinks that contents have an explanatory role to play. What Burge
would dispute is that different contents are sufficient for a
discriminatory capacity. For the no-content view see Stich, S., From
Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief,
Cambridge, M. I. T. Press, 1983. If Stich is right then there is a
much shorter route to individualim than the one I am taking.
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different representation from an object boundary will be used in the
explanation of how we discern larger scaled features of the viewed
shape.
My third point, then, is that attributions of representations are
checked against behavioural evidence.
3 Burge's Argument
We are now in a position to consider Burge's argument that Marr's
theory is not individualistic. The argument is stated in six separate
steps, and a conclusion, as follows:
1) The theory is intentional. 2) The intentional primitives
of the theory and the information they carry are
individuated by reference to contingently existing physical
items or conditions by which they are normally caused and
to which they normally apply. 3) So if these physical
conditions, and possibly attendant physical laws, were
regularly different, the information conveyed to the subject
and the intentional content of his or her visual
representations would be different. 4) It is not incoherent
to conceive of relevantly different physical conditions and
perhaps relevantly different (say, optical) laws regularly
causing the same non-intentionally, individualistically
individuated physical regularities in the subject's eyes and
nervous system.... 05) In such a case, (by 3)) the
individual's visual representations would carry different
information and have different representational content,
though the person's whole non-intentional physical history
... might remain the same. 6) Assuming that some
perceptual states are identified in the theory in terms of
their informational or intentional content, it follows that
individualism is not true for the the theory of vision.
I confess to being somewhat perplexed by the structure of the
argument. Individualism about the mind entails that mental states are
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not individuated (in a necessary or deep manner), by reference to the
external physical items by which they are normally caused. If the
individuative relation mentioned in step 2) of the argument is of the
necessary or deep variety, then little more is needed to refute
individualism. Step 2) attributes to the intentional primitives what
anti-individualism demands of mental states; individuation by reference
to external things. So all that would be required for Burge's desired
conclusion would be that a) if the intentional primitives are not
individualistically individuated, then nor are the intentional contents
that they make up (which is obvious), and that b) some perceptual
states are identified by their contents (which is stated in step 6)). So,
if 2) adverts to deep or necessary individuation, steps 3), 4) and 5)
do not contribute to the argument.
On the other hand if the individuative relation of 2) is not necessary
or deep, then surely step 3) would not follow from it, as Burge claims.
For only if the individuative conditions in 2) were essential (in the
sense explained in section 1) above) to the individuated primitives,
would it be true that if the conditions differed, then so would the
contents.11
I think it is best to assume that the individuative relation of 2) is
meant to be necessary and deep. Step 2) can therefore be seen as the
crucial step of the argument. Steps 3), 4) and 5) can then be treated
as an elaboration of what the anti-individualistic claim of 2) comes to.
11. Burge is normally such a careful and precise thinker that one
wonders why the argument is so disorganized.
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So I shall treat 3), 4) and 5) as an explication of anti-individualism,
rather than as part of the argument for it.
Steps 3)-5) invite us to consider what representational contents a
given earthly subject would have had, had she inhabited an alien
environment in which the very same gray arrays as are here caused by
one sort of distal cause, there result from a distal cause of some
different sort.
Let us give our subject a name, 'Visua'. When we consider how things
would have been with Visua, had matters been otherwise, we shall refer
to her as Visua*. Visua* is thus Visua's counterfactual counterpart, .
Visua as she would have been, had she inhabited some other
environment. Visua and Visua* are individualistically identical. This
means that their individualistic histories are the same. They undergo
the same sequence of gray arrays, their brains, individualistically
considered, undergo the same machinations. But things outside their
three dimensional physical boundaries may be varied.
The features that are to be varied are some of those contingently
existing items or conditions that normally cause Visua's representational
contents, and to which the contents normally apply. Burge claims that
Marr uses such items to individuate contents. In my view, he merely
uses them as a guide to discovering what the contents are. So, to pick
a neutral expression: the items and conditions to be varied are those in
terms of which Marr identifies contents.
In the counterfactual environment these mundane items and conditions
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are systematically replaced by different ones. But these replacement
items and conditions in the counterfactual environment cause the very
same gray arrays as do their actual counterparts. So there are gray
array types the typical distal causes of which will differ across twins.
From now on when I refer to the counterfactuals, without further
qualification, I mean counterfactuals that fit the broad outline just
given: same bodies, environments that are systematically different in
the way described.
There are two claims that Burge might make about Marr's theory and
the counterfactuals. If we take him at what seems to be his word, his
view is that it is a consequence of Marr's theory that in any
counterfactual environment of the envisaged sort, Visua*'s
representational contents would have differed from her actual ones. For
he says that if the relevant items were different, the contents of the
subject's representations would have been different. But there is a
weaker claim that would suffice to satisfy Burge's anti-individualistic
wishes, and perhaps is what he really intends. This would be that
there is at least one counterfactual environment in which Visua* would
have had different reptesentational contents. If the items had been
different, the contents of the subject's representations might have been
different.
The truth of the weaker claim would show that Marr's theory
attributes representational contents in such a way that they do not
depend solely on a subject's individualistic properties. Different
environments would be capable of endowing a given subject with
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different representational contents, even if her individualistic properties
were held constant.
I shall argue against both claims. The argument will proceed as
follows. First I shall make a general point about what we may
legitimately suppose to vary across environments. Then I shall outline a
particular test case and consider what Marr's theory should say about
it. I will offer what I call a 'straightforward' interp Lation of the
theory, upon which it would predict that Visua and Visua* compute
representations with the same intentional contents, even though the
standard distal causes of their gray arrays are quite different. I shall
then explain Burge's "devious" interpretation of Marr, which contradicts
my straightforward one. I shall argue that the predictions yielded by
Marr's theory, deviously interpreted L/ Burge, would be unmotivated
and incorrect. This will undermine the devious interpretation, and
refute Burge's strong claim that in any of the counterfactual habitats
Visua* will have different contents from Visua's. The background will
then be in place to consider the more plausible, but still false, weaker
claim.
The general point is this. Since the patterns of light on the twins'
retinas are identical, and the very earliest representations (up to and
including the zero-crossings, at a minimum) describe those light
patterns, the content of those earliest representations must be the
same. But the computations that derive the higher representations
exploit both the input desriptions and additional, innate assumptions
about the structure of the world. The representational content derived
- 113 -
by a given computation thus depends, in part, upon the innate
assumptions. A given computation of a representation, formally
(syntactically) described, may be given different semantic
intepretations. So, even if we know what the earliest descriptions are,
and what formal processes operate upon them, we cannot yet infer the
content of the representations thereby constructed. How we interpret
the resulting representations must depend upon which assumptions we
attribute to the system. If we regard Visua*'s system as constructing
different representational contents from Visua's, we must also regard it
as making different assumptions.
4 Against Burge's Strong Claim
4.1 'The First Case
Suppose that Visua*'s environment is one in which we had artfully
attached a stereoscope to her face at birth. We have done this in such
a way that she is not aware of it. Her eyes receive only images from
the stereoscope's two screens, which we are capable of adjusting by
remote control. We arrange things so that her stimulations will be
identical to Visua's. The rest of her distal environment, however, will
be different from Visua's.
4.2 The Straightforward Interpretation
r)iscussing the assumptions that allow us to infer a 3D shape from a
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silhouette Marr writes (P. 219):
if a surface violates these implicit assumptions, then we
should see it wrongly. Our senses should deceive us in the
sense that the shape we assign to the contours will differ
from the shape that actually caused them.
Visua*'s environment is one in which the viewed surfaces violate the
implicit assumptions. Specifically, the system will assume that the two
retinal images arise from a single surface, rather than two distinct
surfaces. On a straightforward interpretation of Marr we should predict
- exactly as commonsense dictates - that Visua*'s senses deceive her.
Moreover, we should be able to determine what the contents of her
illusions are (Marr p. 100):
The brain is capable of measuring disparity and using it to
create the sensation of depth. For purposes of
demonstration, a stereoscope from a souvenir shop will do:
when individual views are seen with just one eye they look
flat. However if you have good stereo vision and look with
both eyes the situation is quite different. The view is no
longer flat: the landscape jumps sharply into relief, and
your perceptions are clearly and vividly three-dimensional.
Visua*'s brain is regularly confronted with stereograms, and so
regularly delivers vivid, illusory, representations of 3D scenes. It does
this because those are the representations it constructs from the
relevant arrays. If the gray arrays that in Visua result from 3D objects
were caused in Visua* by our stereoscopic facsimiles, the latter would
derive just the representational contents that the former does. Visua*
would misrepresent flat distal causes as 3D scenes.
Burge writes (p. 35)
If the properties and relations that normally caused visual
impressions were different from what they are, the
individual would obtain different information and have visual
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experiences with different intentional content. If the
regular, law-like relations between perception and the
environment were different, the visual system would be
solving different information-processing problems.
But how would it obtain the different information? How would it solve
the different information processing problems? On Marr's theory the
contributions of environment and organism, to the business of forming
veridical representations, are very carefully separated. The
environment contributes the gray arrays and conforms, usually, to the
assumptions. There is no way that the environment can get the correct
information into the visual system other than by bombarding its
peripheries and conforming to the assumptions. The organism is given
only the gray arrays and its innate assumptions to work with. It must
infer, from the gray arrays, what caused the bombardment.
Marr's theory is designed to tell us how the information processing
problem for this environment is solved. It is solved by the brain's
construction of a representation: the representation is constructed, with
the aid of innate assumptions, from the gray arrays. The representation
will be correct if and only if the conditions assumed by the system
obtain (barring flukes, in which case the description is arrived at by
an unsound inference). When the conditions do obtain, then the
representation will typically be correct, and the information processing
problem will typically be correctly solved. When the cornditions do not
obtain, a representation is constructed that fails correctly to depict its
distal cause.
The construction of representations is thus only the extraction of
information about the environment when the assumed conditions hold. If
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the conditions do not hold, then the system will fail to deliver correct
representations. It won't magically solve another problem. It will screw
up.
If the informational content of a representation is defined by what it
actually regularly covaries with, then, of course, the twins'
representations will carry different information. The question is whether
that sort of informational content is what the visual system manipulates
according to Marr's theory. I am about it to argue that it is not.
4.3 The Devious Interpretation
The straightforward interpretation requires supposing that the
predictions the theory delivers about the representations constructed
from specified gray arrays are not limited in applicability to a range of
contexts that excludes the stereoscope world.
Burge would argue that the predictions are thus limited. He points
out that on Marr's theory (p. 33):
the information carried by the representations - their
intentional content - is individuated in terms of the specific
distal causal antecedents in the physical world that the
information is about and that the representations normally
apply to.
And concludes:
Thus the individuation of intentional content of




The methods of individuation and explanation are governed
by the assumption that the subject has adapted to his or
her environment sufficiently to obtain veridical information
from it under certain normal conditions.
And (p. 37)
the intentional content of one's visual state (or
representation) is individuated against a background in
which the relevant state is normally veridical.
So the devious interpretation of Marr runs like this. We are to
assume that in any environment where representations have standard
causes under normal conditions, the representations will be correct
under those conditions. So, (the interpretation proceeds) if a creature's
visual system is such that it constructs a representation of a certain
type, R, from arrays that are standardly caused, under normal
conditions, by a thing of a certain type T, then the representation will
have an intentional content that represents those causes as things of
type r.
The devious interpretation is thus the analogue for visual
representation of a causal theory of reference of the kind that Putnam1 2
has applied to natural kind terms of natural language, and that Burge
himselfl3 has extended to the content of the propositional attitudes
attributed in folk psychology.
On the devious interpretation, Visua* is assumed to see correctly
12. Putnam, H., 'The Meaning of 'Meaning", in Gunderson, K., ed.,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis, University
of Minnesota Press, 1975.
13. See e. g. 'Other Bodies', in Woodfield, A., ed., Thought And
Object, Oxford University Press, 1982.
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under normal conditions in her environment. Her representations will
represent their typical normal causes correctly. It follows, then, that
she will not be representing the two surfaces of the stereogram as a
single 30D scene, but as two flat surfaces.
But Burge's argument for the devious interpretation is invalid. It is
certainly true that Marr, when studying humans in earthly context,
typically supposes that what a representation represents is what causes
it under normal conditions. But it does not begin to follow from this
that if some other type of distal cause had been the typical one, the
representation would have represented that.
What the theorist needs to find out is what representations are
constructed under what circumstances. One good way to do this is to
find conditions under which the subject appears to see correctly and
then to infer that what is seen is what is there. Under those conditions
the representations will represent their distal causes. For us, here, it
is roughly true that the normal ,ircumstances are the ones in which our
sight works well. Since that is so Marr may attribute to our
representations contents that typically are true of their normal distal
causes. In an environment where the normal circumstances were not
propitious for vision, the representational contents would not typically
be true of their normal causes; they would typically misrepresent them.
There is not the slightest reason to believe that in any environment
where our representations had normal causes, we would be able to see
those causes correctly. Such a supposition lacks independent
plausibility, and is certainly not supported by the computationdl theory
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of vision.
I argued above (in section 2.3) that, on Marr's theory, attributions
of representations are checked against behavioural evidence. So, for
example, Marr uses the observation that we successfully circumnavigate
and manipulate objects, to justify attributing representations in the
form of 3D models. Attributions of representations that would be in line
with the devious interpretation could not survive even this crudest sort
of observational test. For Visua* would not act in any manner
appropriate for one who was correctly perceiving images on two flat
screens just in front of her eyes. She would not, for example, try to
remove the screens, in order to see what was going on behind them.
Behavioural evidence of the kind actually demanded by Marr would
therefore count against the devious interpretation.
The evidence would, however, be quite consistent with the
straightforward intepretation. That interpretation predicts that Visua*
would be illuded, that she would be representing the stereoscopic
images as a single 3D scene. That is just the prediction that fits the
data.
The straightforward interpretation is also in line with intuition. We
know what the phenomenology of 3D vision is like. We know what it is
like to view a stereoscopic picture, and what it like to see things as
flat. We know what it would be like for Visua* to have the experiences
she has, phenomenologically construed. It is very hard to believe that
experiences like that could have representational contents that were
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true of flat surfaces. 1 4
4.4 Recapitulation and Remark
Let me recapitulate the argument so far. Burge correctly perceived
that Marr attributes representations that are correct under normal
circumstances here. Burge inferred, incorrectly, that the underlying
principle was that vision is always correct under normal circumstances
for the seer. A better reading of Marr is that since we have
independent good reason for supposing that we see correctly under
normal circumstances here, the contents the theorist attributes are ones
that in fact represent their typical distal causes. We have no reason for
supposing that Visua* sees correctly in her environment, and so no
reason to suppose that her representations depict their typical normal
causes.
The content of higher representations interacts substantially with
behaviour. When behaviour is appropriate in the light of distal stimuli,
and this fact is legitimately explained in terms of perception, we may
infer that perception is yielding correct representations. When
behaviour is not thus appropriate, we should predict that perception is
15
awry.
14. Perhaps a supporter of Burge would hold that the phenomenal
properties of the twins' perceptual experiences would vary. That would
be an interesting extension of anti-individualism, and one that would
stand in radical need of an argument.
15. Inappropriate behaviour is not, to be sure, conclusive evidence of
misperception. Peculiar desires or false non-perceptual beliefs may be
what is responsible for the wacky behaviour. But all that is required to
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One hypothesis that would be quite reasonable in the light of the
behavioural evidence, would be that Visua*Is representations have
exactly the contents that Visua's do. Since Visua* is Visua's twin, all of
Visua*'s movements would be ones that someone would make, if she were
seeing what Visua actually sees, and responding rationally to her
perceptions. When Visua sees and walks round a sleeping rhinoceros,
Visua* will travel a similarly shaped route. It will be as if Visua*
herself is subject to the illusion that she, too, sees a sleeping
rhinoceros. It would thus be quite safe to attribute to Visua* mental
states, including perceptual states, that are just like Visua's. Nothing
that Visua* does, non-intentionally described, would count against the
hypothesis.
The right way to make sense of what Visua* was doing would seem to
be to ascertain in what sort of environment her motions would be
appropriate. The obvious candidate for such an environment would be
Visua's, and so attributing to Visua* contents that would be true, were
she confronted with the distal causes of Visua's representations, would
be sensible. But Visua's environment might not be the only one in
which Visua* could reasonably be supposed to be seeing successfully.
What if there were another one? That is a topic for the next section.
undermine the devious intepretation is that systematically wacky
behaviour sometimes be explicable in terms of misperception, rather
than other attitudes.
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5 The Weaker Claim
My argument in the First Case depended on the point that successful
sight under normal circumstances cannot be presupposed for just any
old brain in any old environment. Where the subject's behaviour is
inappropriate to her environment, or appropriate in a way that can be
explained without attributing correct visual representations, we should
not automatically attribute correct representations. There is thus
nothing to count against the straightforward interpretation.
5.1 Second Case
Suppose, however, that Visua* is perfectly adapted to her
environment and that the success of her meanderings through it is
attributable not to fluke or artful contrivance, but to her visual
perception. In such a case Burge's argument could proceed without the
false premise that veridicality is automatically assumed to result from
the existence of normal causes.
We shall assume, then, that Visua* wears no stereoscopic glasses and
can see successfully in her environment. The typical distal causes of
some of her gray arrays must still differ from the causes of Visua's
counterpart arrays. But we shall suppose that these differences,
whatever they are, would not give the lie to the view that each
protagonist could correctly perceive the distal causes of her own
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irritations. This could happen if, say, the differences between the
environments were small and subtle, or the items that differed across
the two cases played no significant role in the subjects' lives, or the
items were out of range of senses other than sight.
Burge's argument could then proceed as before. The theorist would
discover that Visua* could see correctly under conditions that were
normal for her. The representations to be attributed would be ones
that, under those conditions, depict their normal causes. By
hypothesis, constraints that are true here, and assumed by Visua's
system, are false in Visua*'s world. So, Burge's argument would go,
the theorist should attribute assumptions to Visua*'s system that were
correct for her world. And, just as Visua's assumptions allow her to
construct correct representations of her distal stimulations on Earth, so
would Visua*'s assumptions allow her to construct representations that
correctly depict her distal stimulations on her world. Since the
stimulations and constraints differ across worlds, Visua and Visua* will
construct representations with different contents.
The case under dispute may be schematically described thus. On
Earth (E) we have a constraint, Ce, that is replaced on Twin Earth (T)
by a different constraint Ct . On E the normal cause of gray array type
G is some item O ; on T the normal cause of gray arrays of type G is
some other sort of thing, O t . The constraints are such that if the
visual system assumes Ce it will infer from arrays G the presence of an
Oe, and so form a representation of intentional type Re, that is
satisfied by, and only by, objects of type Oe. But if it assumes Ct it
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will infer from arrays G the presence of an Ot , and form a




E: Earth T: Twin Earth G: A type of gray array
O : the type of object that normally causes Gs on E
Ot: the type of object that normally causes Gs on T
C : A constraint that is true on E, but false on T
e
Ct: A constraint that is true on T, but false on E
R e: A representation that is true of, and only of, O s
e e
R t : A representation that is true of, and only of, Ots
A visual system assuming Ce will construct Res from Gs
A visual system assuming C t will construct Rts from Gs
(b)
C n: A constraint that satisfied if either Ct or C are
R n: A representation that is true of both Ots and Oes
A visual system assuming C will construct R s from Gs
n n
5.2 Undermining of the Devious Interpretation
On the devious interpretation, we should argue as follows. Visua*
sees correctly on T. On T, Gs are typically caused by Ots. So seeing
correctly requires the construction of Rts from Gs. So Visua*'s system
must be assuming Ct , and constructing representations Rt from Gs.
Visua's system, on the other hand, assumes C to construct R s from
e e
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Gs. Since R s have difterent extensions from Rts, Visua and Visua*
e
undergo representations with different contents.
But this argument is invalid. It does not follow from the fact that Gs
are caused by Ots that correct representations constructed from Gs
must be representations of Ots, hence of intentional type Rt . Any
representation that includes Ots in its extension will be correct on T.
In particular a representation that is satisfied by both Oes and Ots will
be correct on T. If the representations constructed by Visua and
Visua* are of some neutral type R that is satisfied by both O0s and
n e
Ots, then they may see correctly while yet having the same
representations.
Ascribing to both Visua and Visua* representations that would be
correct in either environment is exactly what would be required by the
straightforward interpretation. The straightforward interpretation thus
requires that both protagonists construct representations of the neutral
intentional type Rn. Correlatively, the assumptions we would attribute
would be broad enough to be satisfied in both environments. The
systems would neither assume Ct nor Ce, but some neutral assumptions
C that would be true in both environments. (See Key, part (b)).
Burge's argument that the comp¶Itational theory is not individualistic
depends upon reading into it a particular form of a causal theory of
reference. The Putnamian theory might be true of some parts of natural
language and even of some parts of folk psychology, but one cannot
automatically assume that it applies to a computational theory of a
perceptual module. Scientific psychology will perforce depart from folk
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psychology in various ways. One such departure might well be a failure
to adhere to a causal theory of reference of the folk variety. 16
Burge must attribute to the computational theory of vision a
particular way of choosing, from among the various ways of describing
the typical causes of a correct representation, the one that will give
the content of the representation. In our example the recommended
selection for Visua* would have to he Rt rather than Rn. I find nothing
in Marr's theory to support this interpretation. Both the causal theory
itself and the particular Putnamian version of it are things that Burge
himself has, without provocation, added into the computational theory.
However, even if the theorist of vision espouses no Putnamian causal
theory, she might still attribute contents in the way predicted by the
devious interpretation. If that were the case, it would be because the
balance of various sorts of evidence and argument happened to motivate
attributing to Visua and Visua* the specific representations Re and Rt,
respectively, rather than Rn
I shall argue that the balance would never tip that way. The
attributions predicted on the straightforward interpretation are more in
line with Marr's actual methods, and with the dictates of good
explanation.
16. My own view is that folk psychology comes unstuck on twin earth
cases, dictating both that the twins do have the same psychological
states, and that they do not. I reserve that argument for another
paper.
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5.3 Defence of the Straightforward Interpretation
Let us elaborate the counterfactual. Let us bring Visua* to Earth,
and place her and Visua in a laboratory together. Visua* is still
assumed to be an evolutionary product of and to have grown up in one
of the counterfactual habitats, her visit to Earth is merely
three-dimensional. 17 Let us subject them both to two experiments. In
the first experiment we arrange an experiment in which conditions C
e
are violated, and conditions Ct obtain, and subject the subjects to
objects of type Ot , to cause arrays of type G. In the second
experiment we arrange matters so that conditions Ce obtain, and Gs are
caused by O s.
e
The devious interpretation would have us say that in the first
experiment Visua* correctly sees Ots, but Visua is subject to the
illusion that she is seeing O s. In the second experiment it is Visua
e
who suffers the illusions and Visua* who is seeing correctly. On the
straightforward interpretation they would both be seeing all the distal
causes as 0 s.
n
Representations require a top-down motivation. Top-down motivations
come from finding some use or purpose to which the content is put. So
to motivate the attribution of Ots and Os rather than mere O s, we
would have to find some purpose that the more specific contents could
17. If the strain of imagining that Visua* is Visua herself,
counterfactually described, is now unbearable, you may suppose that
the twins are merely physically type identical.
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serve, but that the vaguer contents could not. We would need to find
some higher computational process into which the contents would feed,
and it would have to make some difference to this process whether its
input was on the one hand R or R , or, on the other, R . What would
e t n
this be? Nothing that issued in any discriminative ability, or
recognitional capacity. For the twins are twins, and will be the same in
every testable respect.
The twins' performances in all the tests we could devise would be the
same. They will, for example, register 3D effects from all the same
stereograms, be able to identify exactly the same 3D shapes from
silhouettes, make the same distinctions among surface markings (for
example distinguish shadow boundaries from highlights from texture
changes from object boundaries), make the same groupings in patterns
and so on.
But it is tests of exactly this kind that the theorist actually uses to
determine how many distinct contents she needs to attribute.
Attributions of representations are checked against just this sort of
behavioural evidence. And there is good reason for this. It would be a
violation of Occam's razor to invoke different contents where the
invocation would be doing no work. There would just be no point to
invoking the two contents, where one would do. For there would be no
theoretical purpose served by distinguishing between the contents.
Consequently the straightforward intepretation has economy on its side.
The devious one scratches where there is no itch.
Moreover, the global considerations that help to justify the
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attribution of contents would be the same in the two cases. For
successes and failures, behaviourally construed, would come at exactly
the same points. The twins would make the same circumnavigations and
manipulations. Visua* would duck to avoid flying objects, duck to avoid
images of such in a 3D movie, read scrawly handwriting, sew buttons
on a shirt, make drawings of what she sees, and so on and on, just as
Visi;a does. It would seem odd to suppose that throughout all this
Visua* would be systematically misperceiving something that Visua was
representing correctly. There would be no motive for attributing
different contents, no explanatory gain to be achieved by doing so.
On the straightforward interpretation we would simply reason that
both twins could solve the information processing problems set by both
Earth and Twin Earth. We would infer that their representations were
of type Rn, and that they were assuming neither Ct not Ce but the
more conservative C - all that was required to account for their
n
representations. And that is exactly what the evidence warrants.
To attribute contents deviously rather than straightforwardly would
not only be out of line with Marr's actual practice, it would run directly
counter to basic canons of good explanation.
The general message is that we can never suppose that a mere
difference in distal cause, however regular, however ubiquitous in
evolutionary background must make a difference to representational
content. To show that the differences between the twins' environments
showed up in perception, we would have to show that their
representations were specific enough to distinguish the two sorts of
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distal cause. Given the identity of discriminative abilities, this could
never be shown. The best theoretical description will always be one in
which the representations fail to specify their extensions at a level that
distinguishes the two sorts of distal cause. It will always be better to
suppose that the extension includes both sorts of thing. 1 8
Being tickled by something is not tantamount to knowing what that
thing is.
6 A Specific Example
Burge (p. 42-3) himself provides an example that nicely illustrates
what is wrong with the devious interpretation, and right with the
straightforward one. It will be worth going over the argument again
with his specific example.
He asks us to imagine a subject, P, among whose early visual
representational types is one regularly caused by thin shadows. In such
a case, Burge argues, the perception would represent slhadows. If the
same perceptual type were on occasion caused by a small crack, Burge
says, then P would misperceive the crack as a shadow. So, even under
normal circumstances P may be fooled by a crack. But suppose that,
18. Note that refusing to proliferate contents beyond what is needed to
explain discriminatory capacities is not special to the computational
theory of vision. The reason why we do not att-ibute, for example, a
concept of bank-managers to dogs is that dogs cannot discriminate
bank-managers (or banks) from other things.
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counterfactually, the optical laws were different. In the counterfactual
world there are no instances of the right sort of shadow. Instead the
very gray arrays that are factually caused by the shadows are,
counterfactually, caused by small cracks. In such a case, Burge says,
P would be visually representing cracks as cracks. 1 9
We face a choice. Do we attribute to P in one environment
representations of shadows, in another, representations of cracks? Or
do we follow the straightforward route and attribute to P, in both
environments, representations of crackdows (thin, dark, marks that
could be either shadows or cracks)?
What would be required for positing the different representational
contents would be a top-down motivation. We would need a reason for
supposing that higher processes exploited the information that it was a
shadow (crack) that marred the visible surface, rather than a
crackdow. If the representation of a crackdow would account for all the
higher processing just as well as would the representation of a shadow
(crack), then it is a crackdow representation that we should attribute.
Anything more discerning would be unmotivated.
But, by hypothesis, P cannot discriminate between shadows and
cracks. We could therefore never locate a capacity of P's the
explanation of which would require the attribution of the more precise
19. Note the analogy with water and XYZ: if there were a small amount
of XYZ on Earth we would probably misidentify it as water. We would
call it 'water', but we would be wrong, as chemical investigation might
show. But on Twin Earth the word 'water' is true of XYZ, which
predominates there.
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content. No top-down motivation would be available.
We do form representations, during early vision, that have contents
of about the specificity of crackdow, and ones that have about the
specificity of shadow or of crack. It will be instructive to consider how
these are arrived at, and what motivates their attribution.
The first representations that reliably covary with external
phenomena are formed when the outputs of the zero-crossing filters are
conjoined (c. f. Burge p. 33). Marr attributes to these representations
the content eJge.
It is not abundantly clear whether "edge" representations are meant
to represent features of the retinal images themselves, or features of
the viewed surface. In three places Marr states that representations at
this level are still of the retinal images (p. 71, p. 91, p. 366); and in
others (p. 41, quoted above, p. 93) strongly implies this. But he also
tends to talk as if they can represent elements of the surface (p. 52,
p. 68, p. 91); and this is how Burge seems to interpret him. Another
possibility would be to think of these representations as being of the
outputs of the zero-crossing filters. In any case, however,
representations that really do refer to external things must arise here
or soon after.20
It is interesting that the theory survives unclarity on this point. It
20. My own view, unlike Burge's, is that we should avoid attributing to
the system representations of external things for as long as possible,
probably until the 2.5D sketch itself. At lower levels we do not need to
attribute such contents to explain what the system is doing.
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does so precisely because nothing is at stake except the inferential role
of the representations, their place in the sequence of steps that mediate
the passage from gray array to 2.5D sketch and the 3D model
representation. It makes no difference whether one treats the edge
segment representations as already referring to marks on the visible
surface, or treats them as referring to previous representations and
sees the later processes as inferring from them the presence of such a
mark.
Let us, in any event, follow Burge in supposing that edge
representations do represent elements of the viewed surface. It is very
important to realize that 'edge' has a very broad meaning. As far as the
early representation goes, an edge could be the boundary of a shadow,
a highlight on a surface, a property of texture, a real surface
reflectance change (for example, one caused by a patch of ink), or an
21
object boundary. 'Edge' thus functions like 'crackdow' to give the
content of an unspecific representation the extension of which is not
matched by that of any simple English expression.
The higher processes perform computations to decide what sort of
"edge" is really present, whether it is a shadow boundary, or a real
physical edge, or whatever. These computations require exploitation of
further information, for example about depth or motion.
21. It would therefore be impossible to construct a twin case for the
content edge. Since any reflectance change on a surface counts as an
"edge", any twin environment will either provide "edges" or be a world
of many illusions, If the distal stimuli were not even marks on surfaces,
then seeing successfully would be out of the question for creatures with
brains like ours.
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What motivates the attribution to the system of a representation that
is really of, say, a shadow boundar/, rather than of an "edge", is the
fact that we can tell, under normal circumstances, what sort of "edge"
we are seeing: we can tell, that is, whether we are seeing a shadow
boundary, or a highlight, or a real physical edge. The representational
content is manifest to us subjectively, and cleary detectable in
discriminatory behaviour. Representations with different contents are
needed to explain the discriminative capacity, and this provides the
top-down motivation for positing them.
It is only because we can normally tell which sort of "edge" we are
seeing, that Marr attributes the different representational contents, and
seeks for an account of how they are inferred from the gray arrays.
Similarly for small cracks and shadows. Only if the subject could
visually discriminate between them, under normal circumstances, would
it be correct to attribute to her crack or shadow representations,
rather than crackdow representations. The system will represent
crackdows as shadows, or as cracks, rather than merely as crackdows,
only if it extracts this information from the retinal array, with the aid
of additional cues, assumptions and computations. Whether or not the
system is doing this depends upon it, not upon what normally causes
the gray arrays.
It is no accident that Burge had to try to make up his own example,
rather than take one from the theory itself. The reason is simply that
every content that the theory actually does attribute has a top-down
motivation and a bottom-up account. The result i. that it is too tightly
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constrained by the individualistic facts, the gray arrays and the
testable dispositions, to construct a twin case. Burge claims that his
general argument, which includes the shadow and crack example 'is
independent of the theory of vision that we have been discussing [i. e.
Marr's theory]. It supports and is further supported by that theory.' It
seems to me, rather, that his argument flies in the face of the theory.
7 Exegesis
Burge's devious intepretation of Marr is defended by two lengthy
examples of specific theoretical claims, and by a couple of additional
quotes. In this final section I will show that the straightforward
interpretation is compatible with all Burge's evidence.
Here are the essentials of one of the specific claims (Burge p. 33):
In building up informational or representational primitives in
the primal sketch, Marr states six general physical
assumptions that constrain the choice of primitives ... (for
example: ] a) the physical world is composed of smooth
surfaces having reflectance functions whose spatial
structure may be complex: b) markings generated on a
surface by a single physical process are often arranged in
continuous spatial structures - curves, lines etc.... These
assumptions are used to identify the physical significance of
- the objective information given by - certain types of
patterns in the image. The computational theory states
conditions under which these primitives form to carry
information about items in the physical world ...
[Clonditions are laid down under which certain patterns
may be taken as representing an objective physical
condition; as being edge, boundary, bar or blob detectors.
I accept this as a fair account of something that Marr does. But how
does this support the claim that 'the intentional primitives of the theory
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... are individuated by reference to physical items and conditions by
which they are normally caused'? Certainly there is reference to
external contingencies, but the reference has, even in Burge's own
words the form of 'assumptions .. used to identify' informational
content. I take this to mean that the theorist uses the assumptions
about the world in order to find out what the representations deployed
by the visual system are. When Marr seeks, as Burge says, to
constrain the choice of primitives, he is trying to limit hypotheses
about which primitives there are in the visual system. He is not laying
down conceptual constraints on what it is for there to be a particular
primitive in a system.
In his second example Burge expresses the relation between Marr,
environment and representation thus (ibid.): 'Marr motivates a central
representational primitive by stating physical constraints'. Again this is
true, and again this fails to support Burge's interpretation. The
physical constraints motivate the representational primitive by providing
evidence about what is being represented. Nothing is entailed about
individuation.
The conflation of what is taken to justify the ascription of a given
content with what makes it the case that the content is there, is
apparent at numerous points in Burge's exposition. He (p. 27) quotes
Marr (p. 43) as saying
The purpose of the representations is to provide useful
descriptions of aspects of the real world. The structure of
the real world therefore plays an important role in
determining both the nature of the representations that are
used and the nature of the processes that derive and
maintain them. An important part of the theoretical analysis
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is to make explicit the physical constraints and assumptions
that have been used in the design of the representations
and processes.
Burge says that this is 'tantamount to the chief point about
representation or rererence that generates our non-individualistic
thought experiments'. The chief point is 'what entities in the objective
world one intentionally interacts with ... affects the semantical
properties of ... representational types ... and how we individuate
them'. So Burge takes 'determining the nature' to mean something like
'partly constituting the essence'. Marr's words here are compatible with
such a reading, but they may more naturally be understood as making a
much more innocent claim.
It is likely that by 'purpose' and Idesign' Marr intends evolutionary
purpose and design. If that is right, then the kind of determination in
question would be evolutionary determination. Marr says (Marr p. 75)
'nature seems to have been very careful and exact in evolving our
visual systems'. For this reason we should expect what goes on in the
visual system to be highly sensitive to features of the real world. The
sensitivity shows up in the representational primitives and the
assumptions exploited by the system. These have been 'carefully and
exactly' selected by evolution. The relation between the structure of
real world and representational content is that the former is an
evolutionary cause of the latter. Marr's point is that if we are to
discover the nature of the representations and processes we must
constantly look to the outside world for evidence. Nothing is said, or
implied, about individuation in the strong Burgian sense.
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A quote from Marr that might seem to lend to support to Burge is
this (Marr p. 44, Burge p. 27)
It is of critical importance that the tokens [representational
particulars i one obtains [in the theoretical analysis I
correspond to real physical changes on the viewed surface:
the blobs, lines, edges, groups and so forth that we shall
use must not be artifacts of the imaging process, or else
inferences made from their structure backwards o the
structure of the surface will be meaningless.
At a casual perusal this passage might seem to indicate adherence to
the view that if a representation is to have meaning, it must correspond
to something in the real world. Lack of such a correspondence would
render the token meaningless. But this is nothing like what Marr is
actually saying. The comment is made in the course of a description of
the task of defining (ibid.)
a representation of the image of reflectance changes on a
surface that is suitable for detecting changes in the image's
geometrical organization that are due to changes in the
reflectance of the surface itself or to changes in the
surfaces orientation or distance from the viewer.
[The representation] should include some type of "tokens"
that can be derived reliably and repeatedly from images and
to which can be assigned values of attributes like
orientation, brightness, size ...
The point is that if one selects tokens that do not correspond to real
physical changes then when one tries to construct from them a complex
sketch of what is going on outside, one will end up with gibberish.
They will simply not be suited to the task of building up coherent
complex representations. Marr is making an empirical claim, not an a
priori stipulation. What else would an empirical scientist be doing?
There is no support for Burge's anti-individualism to be found in these
passages.
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